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This thesis analyzes the British Mandate in Palestine 1920-1948.  It examines the 
significance the British placed on their continued involvement in the Middle East 
following World War I, and the inherent contradictions that were a result of three 
separate agreements, each initiated to distribute lands previously ruled by the Ottomans.  
The British inability to reconcile the promises they made to both the Zionists and the 
Arabs, combined with their Mandate administration policies, shaped the Jewish/Arab 
conflict that has continued until the present day.  The influence of the Zionist lobby on 
British leadership resulted in policies that favorably biased the Jewish population in 
Palestine.  Additionally, Arabs disadvantaged themselves by refusing to participate 
politically with Jews, while Jewish leaders embraced opportunities to establish political 
institutions.  Arab standing was further disadvantaged by British reaction to political 
violence displayed in response to British policies.  The Jewish leadership capitalized on 
every opportunity to consolidate power, while the Arabs missed opportunities by 









































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vii




I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................1 
A.  PURPOSE.........................................................................................................1 
B. MANDATE ADMINISTRATION POLICIES .............................................1 
C.  BRITISH RESPONSE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE................................2 
D. COLLUSION WITH ABDULLAH ...............................................................2 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................3 
II. HISTORICAL BASIS FOR THE CREATION OF THE MANDATE ..................5 
A.  BRITISH HISTORICAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST...............5 
B. CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN PALESTINE......................................8 
C.  ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH MANDATE .................................9 
II. THE BRITISH MANDATORY GOVERNMENT IN PALESTINE....................13 
A.  BACKGROUND............................................................................................13 
B. THE EARLY MANDATE PERIOD............................................................15 
C.  TESTING THE WATERS............................................................................17 
D. NON-COOPERATION .................................................................................22 
E. TEMPORARY TRUCE................................................................................28 
F. POST WAR DEVELOPMENTS..................................................................29 
G. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................32 
IV.  LOW INTENSITY VIOLENCE IN THE PALESTINIAN MANDATE .............35 
A.  ROUND ONE.................................................................................................35 
B. IN WITH BOTH FEET.................................................................................38 
C.  ROUND TWO................................................................................................43 
D. INTENSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS ......................................................47 
E.   THE LAST STRAW......................................................................................49 
F. EXIT STRATEGY.........................................................................................55 
G. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................57 
V.  COLLUSION FOR THE DISPOSITION OF ARAB PALESTINIAN LANDS .59 
A.  LITTLE MAN WITH BIG AMBITIONS...................................................59 
B. WALKING SOFTLY ....................................................................................61 
C.  CARRYING A BIG STICK..........................................................................62 
D. FRIEND OR FOE? ........................................................................................63 
E. LOVE THY NEIGHBOR .............................................................................65 
F. WAR IN EUROPE BUT COOPERATION CLOSE TO HOME.............67 
G. THE END OF THE MANDATE..................................................................68 
H. CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................72 
VI. CONCLUSION ..........................................................................................................75 
WORKS CITED ....................................................................................................................77 


























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ix 




Figure 1. Distribution of Ottoman Lands as Intended from the Sykes-Picot 
Agreement..........................................................................................................6 
Figure 2. The British and French Mandates in Syria, Iraq and Palestine as 
Determined by the San Remo Conference.........................................................8 
Figure 3. The Peel Commission Partition Plan. ..............................................................52 
Figure 4. Israeli Territory 1949: Area of Jewish State as Proposed by the UN and 



































































The author wishes to thank Professor Glenn Robinson for his guidance and 
patience over the course of the past two years.   
She also wishes to thank Professor Hal Blanton for lively discussions on the 
subject and for being there when I needed his help.   
Finally, the author would like to thank her husband, James, for his support in 
listening to countless drafts of this text, his superior knowledge of all things related to the 





























This thesis analyzes the British Mandate in Palestine.  It examines the 
significance that continued involvement in the Middle East region posed for the British, 
and their attempt to reconcile the promises they made to other groups for control of the 
region, with their own interests.  After the defeat of the Ottomans in World War I, the 
Ottoman lands were divided amongst the allied victors of the war.  Britain wanted to 
maintain a sphere of influence in the region to temper the presence of the French, while 
simultaneously ensuring that they remained close to their interests in the emerging oil 
regions and their holdings in the Suez Canal zone.   
The western power’s divisions of the land caused more questions than they 
answered.  Based on wartime correspondence with the British, the Arab population 
believed the land was supposed to revert to them for the creation of an independent Arab 
country.  The Zionists, however, were told in the Balfour Declaration that Palestine 
would be developed as a homeland for the Jews, as a haven from persecution.  Britain 
decided to rule the Palestinian Mandate directly hoping to reach a compromise solution 
that would fulfil both of these promises.   
The Arabs were skeptical of the Mandate from its inception.  They did not want to 
acknowledge the legitimacy of the British mission in Palestine because the Balfour 
Declaration, which first pledged British aid for the Jewish homeland, was included in the 
Mandate charter.  During the Mandate, the British promulgated administrative policies 
intended to recognize the Jewish perspective, as well as the Arab position.  While the 
Jews embraced the opportunities the British provided to participate in the government 
institutions, the Arabs boycotted any situation where Jews were given equal 
representation.  The Arabs demanded proportional representation as they encompassed 
more than ninety percent of the population of Palestine when the Mandate began.  
Nevertheless, the pressure of the powerful Zionist lobby on the political leaders in 
London influenced the creation of policies that advantaged the Jews. 
In addition to proportional representation, the immigration levels of Jews coming 
to Palestine and sales of Arab land to Jews were two of the topics that Arabs protested 
 xiv 
most vehemently.  In these areas, Arabs saw their influence and control of the region 
slipping to the Jews because of the British policies.  As an expression of their 
dissatisfaction with these policies, the Arabs turned to the use of political violence.  Their 
plan to raise awareness and concern for their feelings about these subjects backfired with 
the British and ultimately disadvantaged the Arab cause further.   
Since the Arabs were the first group to use political violence, they assumed a 
reputation as the aggressors of the ensuing conflict.  The Arab actions made British 
officials more sympathetic to Jewish pleas for security, so Jews were more readily 
included in police and security force training.  Additionally, as the conflict continued, the 
British were somewhat more accepting of Jewish violence and retaliation was viewed 
almost as a form of self-defense.  Throughout the conflict, British response to Arab 
violence was swifter and stronger than to Jewish acts of the same magnitude.  The British 
blamed the religious and political leaders of the Arab movement for their role in the 
conflict, and most were forced into exile.  Jewish leaders, however, were not denounced 
by the British and continued to participate in the Mandate government, consolidating 
political power and building institutions. 
One of the Jewish group’s greatest strengths was its ability to unite the Jewish 
people in a single effort to realize their goal of an independent country.  The tribal 
structure of Arab culture disadvantaged the Arab cause and they were not able to achieve 
this success.  The Arab clans were never able to get beyond their tribal rivalries and form 
alliances united in opposition to the Jewish presence.  Abdullah, the ruler of TransJordan 
was no exception.  Abdullah was obligated to the British for his position and for the 
continued security they provided him.  Therefore, he had to balance his own expansionist 
desires with the British pro-Zionist policies he was expected to support.  He entered into 
a scheme of collusion with both the British and the Jews, in separate agreements, to 
achieve his desire to enlarge his land holding, while sacrificing the greater Arab cause.   
This thesis determines that British policies during the Mandate period favored the 
Jewish population.  Immigration policies, land purchase rights and government positions 
afforded the Jews the opportunity to consolidate power in political institutions, which 
would form the basis of the government of the Israeli State.  Additionally, Arab miscues, 
 xv 
political non-participation, and violence disadvantaged this group.  It can be inferred that 
these policies denied them the rule of their own independent country, and is the basis for 
the current Jewish/Arab conflict in the Middle East.     
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
A. PURPOSE   
The declaration of independence for the State of Israel came more than fifty years 
ago, but the conflict between the inhabitants of the region has continued until the present 
day.  Many of the issues Palestinian Arabs are still discontent with find their roots in the 
British Mandatory period and the British policies from that time.  The purpose of this 
thesis is to provide an historical study of the Mandate period in Palestine and the policies 
issued by the British government during their rule.  I will argue that British policy vis-à-
vis the Zionists, as compared to their policy towards the Arabs, resulted in different forms 
of political violence.  These actions further influenced the ability of each group to create 
viable institutions and consolidate political power.  This study of the historical basis of 
the conflict will provide greater understanding for the current context of the conflict and 
may provide insight useful to students of the Middle East peace process.   
B. MANDATE ADMINISTRATION POLICIES  
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, British forces maintained 
a sphere of influence in the Middle East.  The League of Nations Charter for the Mandate 
implied that the British were supposed to impartially aid in the development of Palestine, 
so that it might result in an independent country for the indigenous people of the region.  
However, influenced by the Zionist lobby, the policies the British promulgated for the 
administration of the Palestinian Mandate favorably biased the minority Jewish portion of 
the population.   
The powerful lobbying by the World Zionist Organization kept pressure on 
western governments, especially Britain, to ensure that Palestine was developed as a 
national home for the Jews.  Jewish immigration continued, despite Arab protests, and 
Jews were given disproportionate levels of representation in the local government and 
positions of political power.   
Jewish leaders embraced the opportunities to participate in the government 
institutions, while Arab leaders boycotted working in any situation where Jews were 
given equal recognition.  The British policies offered Jewish leaders continued political 
access, while the Arab leaders disadvantaged themselves of British recognition by 
2 
refusing to participate politically with the Jews.  The British policies, and Arab reaction 
to them, directly influenced the Jewish/Arab conflict that has continued for over half of 
the last century.   
C. BRITISH RESPONSE TO POLITICAL VIOLENCE 
The Arabs were the first group to use political violence to express their 
dissatisfaction with British policies.  Accordingly, they assumed a reputation as the 
aggressors of the ensuing conflict.  Furthermore, British response to Arab political 
violence was swifter and stronger than their reaction to Jewish acts of the same 
magnitude.  Early Arab violence directed toward the Jews made British Mandate officials 
sympathetic to Jewish pleas for increased security.  Additionally, since the Arab forces 
were the first to use violence, the British governors were somewhat more accepting of 
Jewish violence, as the conflict continued, because it was seen as a form of self-defense.  
The British more readily included Jewish personnel in police and security force 
training, and turned a blind eye to the weapons caches the Jews were accumulating.  The 
British policies, either directly through training or indirectly by allowing weapons 
collection, predisposed the Jewish forces to be better prepared than the Arabs for political 
violence and the eventual war for independence.   
When the conflict continued and even escalated over the years, the British often 
downplayed Jewish actions, even when they were committed without provocation.  As 
the minority group in the region, the Jews had the “moral high ground” advantage of 
claiming that any violent act they committed was necessary for their very survival.   
When the tide turned in the 1930s and Jewish forces were initiating political 
violence for their own motivations, the British did not show the same sympathy for Arab 
retributions.  The religious and political leaders of the Arab faction lost favor with the 
British for their role in the disturbances, and were forced into exile, while their Jewish 
counterparts were still welcomed in the British government structure. 
D. COLLUSION WITH ABDULLAH 
The tribal structure of Arab culture disadvantaged them as well.  Unlike the Jews, 
who were able to consolidate power for one united goal, the Arab clans were unable to 
form alliances and present a united front in opposition to the Jewish presence.  Each 
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group, historically, was concerned with their own power base and survival.  Abdullah, the 
Hashimite ruler of TransJordan, was no exception.   
British government involvement in the Middle East established regimes that felt 
obligated to them for their existence, and afforded the British the ability to influence 
these new nations and their political positions vis-à-vis the situation in Palestine.  In the 
case of TransJordan, the British artificially created the borders of that nation and were 
responsible for Abdullah’s appointment.  He was consequent ly motivated by his 
obligation to the British for his position, and their continued security that helped him 
retain that post.  Abdullah had to balance his own desires to further his holdings in 
Palestine, with the British pro-Zionist policy.   
As conflicts in the Palestinian Mandate intensified between the Jews and Arabs, 
the British colluded with Abdullah to support the Jewish aims, or rather, refrain from 
aiding the Arabs in their opposition to the Jews.  Abdullah secretly agreed, in exchange 
for a larger portion of land in the Palestinian region.  With British instigation, he 
embarked in a scheme of collusion with the Zionists based on his own self- interest and 
desires, rather than those of a greater Arab cause. His reaction to growing Jewish power 
and increasing Arab discontent was more in line with the British response than with that 
of other Arab nations. 
In conclusion, the British government policies favored the Jewish population.  
Immigration policies, land purchase rights and government positions afforded the Jews 
the opportunity to consolidate their power in political institutions, which would form the 
basis of the government of the Israeli State.  Additionally, Arab miscues, political non-
participation, and violence disadvantaged this group.  It can be inferred that these policies 
denied them the rule of their own independent county, and is the basis for the current 
Jewish/Arab conflict in the Middle East.  
E. METHODOLOGY  
This thesis will apply qualitative analysis to secondary source materials, some of 
which was compiled from recently declassified Israeli government files.  The thesis is 
organized in the following manner: Chapter Two offers an historical interpretation of the 
British interest in Palestine and their decision to remain in the region, assuming 
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responsibility for the governance of the Mandate.  Chapter Three reviews the British 
administrative policies.  Chapter Four analyzes British response to political violence and 
examines the differences between their reactions to Jewish violence ve rsus Arab 
violence.  Chapter Five reveals the collusion that occurred between both the British and 
Jewish leaders, and Abdullah, ruler of TransJordan.  Chapter Six offers conclusions. 
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This chapter offers an historical interpretation for initial British interest in 
Palestine and their decision to remain in the region, assuming responsibility for the 
governance of the Mandate.  It considers the strategic benefits that the British hoped to 
exploit through their continued presence in the area, and the actions that they took in 
order to realize their sovereignty in the region.  Further, it briefly introduces the 
frustrations that the Arabs felt because of policies that advantaged the Jews early in the 
establishment of the Mandate.  
A. BRITISH HISTORICAL INTEREST IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
During the nineteenth century, Britain's interests in the Middle East were best 
served by maintaining the integrity of the Ottoman Empire.  The Ottomans effectively 
stopped Russia's imperial advances, thus ensuring a balance of European power between 
Russia and Britain.  The symbiotic relationship between the Ottomans and Britain 
allowed Britain to enjoy unimpaired transit through the region, furthering its ability to 
provide security to the jewel of its empire, India.1   
The eruption of World War I ended the period of quasi-peace that pervaded the 
Middle East over the past several decades.  Ultimately, the Ottoman Empire entered the 
war as an ally of the Germans, primarily because of their long-standing feud with Russia 
over land in the Caucasus, despite attempts from the British to avoid this eventuality.  
The British, who had previously supported the Ottomans as a means to maintain a 
balance of power in the region, were now obligated to take actions against the Ottomans.  
The agreements the British initiated with her allies would result in dismembering the 
defeated Ottoman Empire at the conclusion of the war.   
Sharif Husayn of Mecca used the opportunity of Britain’s presence in Egypt to 
seek their aid in keeping the Ottomans out of the Hijaz so that he might retain a greater 
degree of autonomy.  After being turned down by the British initially, Husayn was 
                                                 
1 Matthew A. Fitzsimons, Empire by Treaty: Britain and the Middle East in the Twentieth Century 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame Press, 1964) p. 4. 
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involved in a series of exchanges with Henry McMahon, the High Commissioner in 
Cairo.  The British correspondence promised the Arabs independent countries in Greater 
Syria and the Arabian Peninsula in exchange for Husayn’s forces inspiring an Arab 
Revolt.  The disruption would likely distract Ottoman troops, lessening their strength to 
fight the British at the Suez Canal.  The British further led Husayn to believe that in 
exchange for his support they would advance a proclamation of an Arab caliphate, 
ostensibly from his familial line.   
In separate negotiations, the groundwork for the Sykes-Picot Agreement occurred 
just after the time that McMahon was pledging his commitment to Husayn.  The Sykes-
Picot Agreement plan for the division of the Middle East is illustrated in Figure 1.   
 
Figure 1.  
Distribution of Ottoman Lands as Intended from the Sykes-Picot Agreement (From Ian J. 
Bickerton and Carla L. Klausner, A Concise History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 3rd 
Edition (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1998) p. 39.)  
 
Diplomats Georges Picot and Sir Mark Sykes reached an agreement to dissect and divide 
the land that was previously part of the Ottoman Empire between their countries, France 
and Britain respectively.2  The British wanted to be sensitive to the imperial aims of their 
                                                 
2 Sari J. Nasir, The Arabs and the English, 2nd edition (London: Longman Group, Ltd., 1979) p. 134. 
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ally and were willing to allow the creation of a French sphere of influence in the region.  
As an additional benefit, the British were able to establish a buffer zone between 
themselves and the Russians, a remnant of “nineteenth-century strategic principles, that 
Britain should never share a frontier with the Russians.”3   
In a third proclamation, the British issued the Balfour Declaration calling for the 
creation of a national home for the Jews in Palestine.  According to speculation from 
some historians, Balfour directed his letter to Lord Rothschild to elicit support from 
Bolshevik Jews, thus ensuring that Russia remained in the war against Germany. 
Additionally, Balfour hoped that American Jews would “encourage President Woodrow 
Wilson to enter the war on the side of the Entente.”4  The language used in each of the 
three agreements negotiated by the British in the war period was purposefully vague in 
order to manipulate each of the parties involved.   
At the conclusion of the war, the British were able to use the vague language of 
the McMahon le tters to recant many of the promises made to the Sharif.5  The Husayn-
McMahon correspondence varied at times from “oversight and incompetence” to sections 
of evasiveness amounting to complete deceit by the British of their intentions and 
commitments to others, specifically the French. 6  The British supposedly thought the 
“incorrigible [Arab] children could easily be lied to and could be put off by a few apt 
political promises.”7  In hindsight, the contradictions in promises made to the French, 
Zionists and Arabs are apparent, but the British were able to mislead Husayn regarding 
the level of involvement that the French would have in Syria and Lebanon.  
“Misinterpretation” of regional borders and creative translations of their intentions 
allowed the British to fulfill the promises made to its French ally, and to continue 
advocating their pledge for the Zionist agenda in Palestine, while simultaneously 
claiming that obligations to the Arabs had been met.  
                                                 
3 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 3rd edition  (Boston: St. Martin’s Press, 
Inc., 1996) p. 48. 
4 Ibid, p. 50. 
5 John Bagot Glubb, Britain and the Arabs: A Study of Fifty Years, 1908-1958 (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1959) p. 134. 
6 Smith, p. 47. 
7 Nasir, p. 134. 
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B. CONTINUED INVOLVEMENT IN PALESTINE 
After World War I, the British wanted to maintain a presence in Palestine because 
the widespread discovery of oil, and its potential for economic exploitation, added to the 
British desires for their interests in the region to remain secure.  They wanted to remain 
close to their own holdings, while tempering the influence of the French in the region.  
However, the debate over who were to be the rightful rulers of the region began almost 
immediately.  Questions arose surrounding the rule of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine.  The 
British briefly attempted to undermine the Sykes-Picot agreement by a fait accompli 
when they allowed Husayn’s son, Faisal, to establish himself in Damascus.  Ultimately, 
the British were obligated to uphold the promise to their western ally because solidarity 
in Europe was deemed too important to jeopardize over Arab affairs.8  In the aftermath of 
the war, the western powers negotiated at the San Remo Conference and definitively 
carved the plentiful lands once belonging to the defeated Ottomans into several colonial 
districts.  The conference asserted Mandatory rights in Syria and Lebanon to the French, 
while Iraq (including the Mosul region) and Palestine were awarded to the British, as 
noted in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2.  
The British and French Mandates in Syr ia, Iraq and Palestine as Determined by the San 
Remo Conference (From Bickerton and Klausner, p. 44.) 
                                                 
8 Mary C. Wilson, King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987), p. 40. 
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While the French chose to rule its colonies directly, the British preferred to rule 
through intermediary local notables.  Consequently, in these areas, the British selected 
rulers based on their acceptability to the indigenous population, but more importantly for 
their amenability and loyalty to the Crown.  The British sacrificed Faisal’s independent 
Arab Syria in favor of conciliation to the French, and the future of Palestine was left 
uncertain due to the Balfour Declaration’s intention to establish a Jewish home.9  
However, to calm the rising rebellion building in the Arab Middle East, the British 
stationed Faisal in Iraq.  His elder brother Abdullah, who was initially supposed to take 
the Iraqi post, was granted the eastern section of Palestine, henceforth known as 
TransJordan.  The British then employed their military and financial superiority to 
influence these newly established governments and ensure that British political desires 
received their full support. 
In order to gain local support for their direct control of Palestine, the British 
attempted to establish ties with the indigenous Jewish and Arab people.  British leaders 
spoke to Arabs, stating their approval of an appointment for a "son of the King of the 
Hijaz" to a position as ruler of the independent part of Syria. 10  The British reputation as 
the liberators of the Arabs from the Ottomans, coupled with this rather mild declaration 
for partial Arab independence, tacitly secured the approval of the Arabs.  Simultaneously, 
they wanted to do nothing to prejudice the Zionist movement and asked for Jewish 
support of the British Mandate, to strengthen their position further. 
C. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE BRITISH MANDATE   
Long before the British government officially assumed responsibility of the 
Mandate in Palestine in 1920, Zionist leaders concluded that their relations with the 
British would directly influence the realization of their goal to create a Jewish State.  The 
World Zionist Organization (WZO) was created as a powerful lobby group that raised 
funds and awareness for Jewish issues worldwide.  They also kept political pressure on 
the western governments, particularly Britain, to ensure the creation of a Palestinian 
national home for the Jews.  The WZO supplied the Jewish population in Palestine with 
                                                 
9 Smith, p. 62. 
10 Elizabeth Monroe, Britain's Moment in the Middle East: 1914-1956 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1963) p. 42. 
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strong financial and political support in order to strengthen their position in the region 
socially, politically and militarily.   
Despite Arab protests and the recommendations of the Mandate governors in the 
region, the official British government position gave the Jews disproportionate 
representation in the administration and supported high immigration levels for Jewish 
people into the region.  The Arab population requests for proportional representation 
were denied and Jewish integration into government posts continued.  Jewish leaders 
benefited from opportunities to work in positions of political and military power, while 
Arab leaders did a disservice to themselves when they boycotted working in any setting 
where Jews received equal representation.  The British policies therefore advantaged and 
empowered Jewish leaders and afforded them continued governmental access to political 
and military institutions, while Arab leaders denied themselves recognition in the 
Mandatory Administration by refusing to participate politically with Jews.  
Even before Britain replaced their military government in Palestine with a civil 
administration, the Palestinian Arabs were unhappy with the British pro-Zionist policies.  
Unfortunately, their political structure was fragmented such that they could not 
effectively present their issues to the British in a manner that would cause the 
government to respect their desires for the administration and assess the decision making 
accordingly.   
With no institutionally viable alternative to display their frustrations, the Arabs 
turned to violence.  They believed that their outbursts would raise awareness of their 
issues and require the British to negotiate with them.  This was not the case.  In fact, early 
Arab violence directed toward the Jews made the British Mandate officials more inclined 
to grant Jewish claims of increased security needs.  Furthermore, since the Arabs were 
the first to use political violence, they were labeled as the aggressors in the conflict, and 
Jewish violence became considered as a defensive response by the British.  
Consequently, the British included Jewish personnel in armed defense training, and 
denied knowledge of the weapons caches the Jews were accumulating.  The British 
policies, either directly through training for the police and security forces or indirectly by 
11 
allowing weapons collection, prepared the Jewish forces better than the Arabs for a 
violent conflict and the eventual war for independence.   
As the conflict intensified in the second decade of the Mandate, British reaction to 
Arab violence was routinely swifter and stronger than to Jewish actions, even when 
Jewish incidents were offensive acts.  As the numerically inferior group in the region, the 
Jews were justified in claiming that the violent acts they perpetrated were necessary to 
save their population from likely decimation at the hands of unchecked Arabs.  After the 
great Arab Revolt of the mid-1930s, Jewish forces were initiating political violence to 
realize their own objectives, but the British did not show the same sympathy for Arab 
retributions.  The religious and political leaders of the Arabs were denounced by the 
British for failing to quell the unrest and were forced to flee in exile.  Meanwhile, leaders 
of the Jewish movement were embraced by the British Mandate Administration, and were 
encouraged to continue to develop the political institutions that would be necessary for 
the consolidation of power and the preparation for their claim of independence. 
Initially, when the British came to Palestine, they liberated the Arabs from the 
oppressive rule of the Ottomans.  Ironically, during their rule, the Arabs were unable to 
realize independence.  Rather, they were once again subjugated to follow the policies of 
an outside power.  The British, influenced by the Zionists, and eager to fulfill their pledge 
to establish a Jewish national home in Palestine, issued policies that advantaged the Jews.  
Arab cries for decreased Jewish immigration and proportional representation were 
dismissed, and their use of violence to voice their disapproval of conditions in Palestine 
further alienated them from influential government positions.  By the end of the British 
Mandate, the Arabs would have less autonomy than they had under the Ottomans and 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
13 




This chapter reviews the British administrative policies in the Mandate.  
Specifically, it looks at whether these policies indirectly advantaged the Jews in their 
quest to consolidate political power in Palestine.  Additionally, background information 
is given on the Zionist interest to establish a home in Palestine and the British support for 
this proposal.  Finally, there is discussion of Arab disapproval of the British pro-Zionist 
policies and their non-cooperation with the Mandate government.  
A. BACKGROUND 
Following the French Revolution, the concept of citizenship replaced the ruler-
subject relationships across Europe, with all people seen as equals and deserving of equal 
rights.  However, the Dreyfus Affair scandal in France, the symbolic center of 
nationalism, led Jews around Europe to re-examine their political standing and the levels 
of acceptance they enjoyed in their respective countries. Theodor Herzl, a Viennese 
journalist, wrote Der Judenstaat  (The Jewish State) to express his beliefs that the only 
ways Jews could expect to be treated as more than second-class citizens was to have a 
country of their own, where they would comprise a majority of the population.  He 
advocated establishing a haven for those who suffered from persecution and oppression.  
Herzl’s writings led to the formation of the Zionist movement, and the rationale for the 
eventual creation of a Jewish State.   
The first wave of immigration to Palestine, or aliyah, began in 1882, because of 
the anti-Semitism of Czarist Russia, and was mostly comprised of deeply religious 
members of an organization called the Lovers of Zion. 11  These poor, young colonists 
came to the land of their forebears mostly as pious pilgrims attempting to escape the 
religious persecution they were subjected to in their native Russia, and lived largely 
separate lives from the predominantly Muslim population.  The second aliyah, from 
1905-1914, saw the first wave of immigrants influenced by the Zionist message.  This 
group, mostly young men in their early twenties, had a dream to create a socialist utopia 
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where exploitation, materialism and anti-Semitism would not exist in the society.  The 
social institutions created by the immigrants of the second aliyah would become the 
organizational backbone for the Jewish community in the Palestinian Mandate and 
eventually the independent Jewish State. 
Jewish immigration to Palestine was quelled during World War I.  In fact, many 
of the Jews of the first and second aliyahs left because of poor economic conditions in the 
area.  Additionally, the Ottomans, who had sided with the Central Powers during the war, 
deported many others who had immigrated from Allied countries.12  At the conclusion of 
the war, the British were the occupying power in Palestine, and Jewish immigration 
resumed.  The third aliyah began with the encouragement of the Balfour Declaration.  
In an attempt to establish a haven from the Jewish persecution occurring 
throughout Europe, the World Zionist Organization tried to garner backing for their plan 
to develop an autonomous Jewish region in Palestine.  By 1917, after meeting influential 
Zionist leader Chaim Weizmann, many top officials in the British government supported 
the Zionist agenda, including Sir Mark Sykes and Prime Minister Lloyd George.  The 
Balfour Declaration, given on November 2, 1917, was actually a letter written from 
Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour to Lord Rothschild stating: 
His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine 
of a national home for the Jewish People, and will use their best 
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of that object, it being understood 
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political 
status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country. 13 
The press did not remark on the letter when it was published in The Times one week later 
and it "created a mere ripple of public interest."14  Yet, over the next three decades, this 
single sentence would generate outcry from both Zionists and Arab Palestinians.  The 
purposefully vague language in Balfour's letter would have both groups calling for 
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alternately stricter and weaker interpretations of British policy.  In hindsight, to the 
British government, the Balfour Declaration was a statement made during a time of war, 
"without sufficient consideration of its implications, or the prior claims of the Arabs."15 
In the 1917 declaration, Balfour had expressed sympathy on behalf of the British 
government for the Jewish goal to establish a homeland in Palestine.  Clearly, the Jews 
were the point of reference in his statement, since they were specifically mentioned by 
name, yet the Arab inhabitants of the region, who constituted 93 percent of the 
population, were referred to as merely “existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.”16  
(The same semantic references and omissions are evident again in the text of the League 
of Nations’ Mandate charter.)  The British position is not surprising since “the plight of 
the existing inhabitants, the Palestinian people, was not on the agenda of Western powers.  
This largely peasant society was looked at with indifference or contempt…”17   
In fact, the British had already betrayed the Arabs once, dismissing the promises 
made to the Hashimites in the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence in favor of placating 
the French, their western ally, with the Sykes-Picot Agreement.  Zionism was primarily a 
European movement and the British, it seemed, could more easily identify with that than 
the fragmented, tribal structure common to the “backward” Arab people.  Additionally, 
the Zionist agenda, was in the odd position to receive support from both ends of the 
spectrum: from the Zionist supporters who favored the plan to establish a homeland in 
Palestine, and from the anti-Semites who were eager to support any plan which would 
reduce the number of Jews in their proximity. 
B. THE EARLY MANDATE PERIOD 
The British occupied Palestine as a military administration from 1917-1920, but 
the Mandate of Palestine did not officially begin until after the San Remo Conference in 
April 1920.  The ruler of Palestine had already caused some debate. The Husayn-
McMahon correspondence had led Arab leaders to believe that Palestine was included in 
land specified as Arab.  However, the Balfour Declaration mirrored a memorandum by 
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the Zionist organization ear-marking Palestine as a home for the Jews, and the Sykes-
Picot agreement further confused the situation.  The unclear British policy resulted in 
political difficulty for the newly created Mandate, "that of reconciling an unwilling Arab 
majority to the implementation of the British government's policy of favoring Zionism."18 
After World War I, the British requested the administration of the Mandate for 
Palestine from the League of Nations.  There were several factors that influenced their 
desire to maintain their rule over the region, only one of which was their sponsorship of 
the Zionist enterprise.19  The British were interested in maintaining their influence in the 
Middle East as a strategic base from which they could remain close to their interests in 
the Suez Canal zone and the emerging oil regions in the Mosul valley of Iraq.  They also 
wanted to ensure that they continued to temper the influence of their unpredictable ally, 
the French, in the region, and create a buffer zone between their position and the 
Russians.20  However, the biggest influence on the decision to remain in Palestine was 
the unfettered land route access they would have to India, the spotlight of the imperial 
holdings.   
Palestine itself held no financial benefit for the British.  In fact, the maintenance 
of the administration was such a financial burden, that the British often considered 
pulling out of the country. 21  Furthermore, the strategic benefit that was anticipated to be 
gained from Palestine was often overshadowed by the political problems that arose, with 
no solution in sight.  The Holy Land had an undeterminable emotional draw to the 
Christians.  Although many top military officers warned the political leaders that nothing 
was to be gained from Palestine, the British officials wanted to redeem their honor by 
following through on their promise to the Zionists.  “The British government had still not 
defined its objectives in the Middle East; its intention was to “muddle through” and 
satisfy everyone.”22  Besides, the government would not embarrass itself by admitting to 
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the League of Nations the reality that they no longer wanted the responsibility of the 
Mandate.  They “decided to hope for the best and let things drift.  Perhaps something 
would turn up – the British had a reputation for muddling through.”23  
C. TESTING THE WATERS 
The actual beginning of the British administrative Mandate came after three years 
of military rule, during which the British tried to revive the seriously underdeveloped 
region.  Under Ottoman rule, Palestine had been neglected and the British were tasked 
with improving the health conditions, water and supply lines and government 
infrastructure.  When General Allenby’s army marched into Jerusalem in December 1917 
to liberate the area from the Turks, he was met with the popular enthusiasm from both 
Jews and Arabs.  Mayor al-Husayni of Jerusalem was so anxious to surrender to the 
British that he had to attempt the gesture some seven times before it was accepted by 
Allenby - in a full ceremony, complete with a moving-picture camera to document the 
event.24  Sadly, the optimism that the Arabs had for rule under British control would be 
short lived.   
The Arabs were not the only ones who were having second thoughts about the 
benefits of the administration.  During this period, the officers of the military 
administration were inclined to view Zionism as a nuisance, and felt that the 
government’s support of the movement would hinder their ability to rule Palestine with 
“benevolent neutrality.”25  However, the Zionist lobby had campaigned diligently in 
London during the war for support and the British concluded that promoting the Zionist 
movement would positively serve its interests in the Middle East.  The British accepted 
the Zionist proposal to send an advisory delegation to Palestine, but the Zionist Congress 
quickly began functioning essentially as the first Zionist government, and was often 
engaged in a power struggle with the military administration. 26  The military officials 
understood what London was unable to see: the Zionist Commission would likely 
antagonize the Arabs.   
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The Palestinian Arabs, who had been ruled for centuries by the Ottomans, were 
left with a weak and fragmented tradition of independent political organization. 27  They 
did not have any political institutions on par with the Zionist Commission to campaign 
for their interests.  Additionally, the Zionists had at their disposal a powerful lobby, 
which was able to raise substantial funds for their disposal.  They created programs to 
develop jobs, aided farmers, purchased land on which to found settlements and provided 
loans to individuals.  At one point, the Zionists were successful in demanding that all 
administration announcements be made in Hebrew, as well as English and Arabic.  The 
military administrators realized that attempts to remain out of local politics could not be 
avoided.  Even though they did not give the Zionists everything they wanted, they 
realized that continuing the British government policy to advance the Zionist agenda was, 
in and of itself, giving the Zionists preferential treatment, and likely to cause Arab 
unrest.28  
By 1919 the Jewish population amounted to 58,000, which was significant even 
though the Arab population was nearly ten times that figure.29 The continuing 
immigration added to Arab fears of the significance of the growing Jewish presence.  
Almost immediately after the Mandate became official, disturbances broke out in 
Palestine.  Arabs attacked Jews, killing five, in protest for the non-fulfillment of wartime 
promises of an independent Arab region and to voice their belief that the establishment of 
a Jewish home would lead to Arab subjugation.  "From the beginning of the Mandate, 
representative Arab leaders in Palestine refused to recognize the validity of the Mandate 
or the right of Britain to enforce the Balfour Declaration and demanded independence."30  
Over the years, Arab hostility would shift direction to include British officials of the 
Palestinian Administration, not just the Jews. 
After discussions with the Arab Delegation and Zionists, Winston Churchill, then 
Secretary of State of the Colonies, published a statement of British policy in Palestine.  
His terms reaffirmed the Balfour Declaration but claimed that Britain did not have any 
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aim to see Palestine become "Jewish, as England is English."  This declaration was just 
one of several statements of policy issued by the British and a Legislative Assembly was 
developed to address further issues.  The Zionist organization readily accepted the stated 
policy, but the Arab Delegation in London refused to concur and boycotted participation 
in elections to the Assembly unless a clear majority of Arabs was represented.  A later 
suggestion to develop an Arab Agency, as a counterpart to the Jewish Agency, was also 
rejected.  As the President of the Executive of the Arab Congress wrote to High 
Commissioner Sir Herbert Samuel,  
The object of the Arab inhabitants of Palestine is not an Arab Agency 
analogous to the Zionist Agency.  Their sole objective is independence.  
The Arab owners of the country cannot see their way to accept a proposal 
which tends to place them on an equal footing with the alien Jews.31   
Following the anti-Jewish Easter Riots of 1921, and the breakdown of every attempt to 
introduce self-government in Palestine by the Jews and Arabs together, the British 
government voiced doubts about the practicality of an eventual independent Palestine.  
First High Commissioner of the Mandate, Samuel, a Zionist supporter, feared that the 
region had "a recipe for a second Ireland" and began to encourage separate communal 
institutions.32  The result was a trend of internal partition that, in the end, drove Jews and 
Arabs even further apart.  
The years between the Easter Riots in 1921 and 1929 were relatively peaceful in 
Palestine.  The British continued the policy of direct rule in the Mandate government.  It 
did very little to modify its political outlook with respect to the Balfour Declaration 
because there were concerns that the Jews were still too weak to run the country and the 
factionalized Arabs were “too backward.”33  The primary consideration was strategic: 
that if the British did not continue to rule Palestine, a power vacuum would occur, 
leaving the area vulnerable to a takeover by France, Italy or Turkey.  Any other power in 
the region threatened the connection to the rest of England’s empire through the Suez.  A 
secondary factor was associated with British policy: the assumption by British leaders in 
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London that British presence in Palestine related to the support for Zionism.  Conversely, 
officials in Palestine found that ardent support for Zionism was one of the strongest 
obstacles to a successful administration causing a deeper rift with Arab community.  
However, the Palestinian officials recognized that a “commitment to the Zionists could 
not be ignored” without a loss of consistency, self-respect and honor.34        
In Palestine, the Jews continued to live with a sense of common purpose.  They 
conducted general elections for an Elected Assembly, and appointed a National Council, 
which the British recognized, to preside over local civil matters.  Once they established 
“legally sanctioned institutions,” the Zionist groups, especially the Labor Federation, 
Histadrut, dedicated themselves to improving working conditions and providing work 
and services to its members.35  The Jews continued to amass political power throughout 
the first half of the decade and marveled at their increasing immigration figures, 
especially in 1924 and 1925, when the United States put a quota on its immigration 
redirecting many Jews to Palestine.  However, nearly one quarter of Jewish immigrants 
coming into Palestine did not stay and due to the economic depression sweeping the area.  
In 1927 emigration actually surpassed immigration.  36  Even though the numbers of 
immigrants were relatively low, the Arabs voiced their displeasure with the policy.  The 
Arabs were not afforded any position in the negotiations for immigrant permits.  The 
British worked with the Zionist Executive, the administrative cabinet that would head the 
Jewish Agency, to determine the quota limits.  “On the whole, the Zionists worked in 
tandem with the government and with its consent.”37      
The reduced immigration in 1927 quieted some of the concerns voiced by Arabs 
in preceding years.  The British naively believed that the rest of the grievances could be 
negotiated, but hopes for peace were dashed after disputes broke out in Jerusalem at the 
Wailing Wall in September 1928.38  The pattern of peace over the previous several years 
had convinced the British to withdraw their Cavalry Regiments in favor of a locally 
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comprised TransJordan Frontier Force.  The riots at the Wailing Wall took the Mandate 
Administration completely by surprise and left the Jews defenseless when Arab 
policemen were hesitant to fire upon the mob.39  It became obvious through the incident 
at the Wailing Wall that ethnic favoritism outweighed appropriate action commensurate 
to the government position.  During the course of the riots, more than 130 Jews, and at 
least 115 Arabs, were killed.  Unfortunately, the British attributed the severity of the 
rebellion to an insufficient garrison, and did not see the deeper causes.  The British and 
the Permanent Mandates Commission ordered inquiries dispatched to form 
recommendations for the maintenance of order in Palestine.  An additional outcome of 
the riots was increased British training of Jews for the police and defense forces. 
The Arab demands of the Mandate were clear.  First, they called for a cessation of 
Jewish immigration.  Palestinian Arabs held a substantial majority, but they did not want 
Jewish numbers to increase any further, reducing their proportional significance.  Second, 
they wanted a declaration that Arab lands were unalienable.  The powerful World Zionist 
Organization raised enormous sums of money worldwide for the Jewish cause in 
Palestine.  Much of that money financed Jewish immigration and land purchases.  The 
Palestinian Arabs wanted to prohibit absentee landlords from making Arab rented lands 
available to Jewish purchase.  Finally, they wanted a democratic government established 
with popular representation, which would ensure that Arab majority views dominated.40   
However, the riots of 1929 essentially backfired for the Arabs.  Rather than spark British 
interest in their concerns, the violence actually reinforced British bonds to the Zionist 
policies.            
Chaim Weizmann spoke for the Zionists, demanding the safeguard of Jewish 
property, incorporation of Jews into the defense forces, and increased immigration.   
When the British responded that the Arab demands were incompatible with the 
requirements of the Mandate, bolstering the Jewish cause, the Permanent Mandates 
Commission countered.  It issued a sharp reply criticizing the British for not preparing 
the Arabs for changes expected with Jewish immigration.  Additionally, there was a lack 
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of consensus between London and Palestine within the British government over Zionist 
claims.  This factor coupled with world developments in the 1930s, where Nazi 
persecution of Jews added to the desperation for asylum in a Jewish state, and threats of 
German or Italian challenges to Britain, ultimately led to confusion in British policy. 41  
Britain began to sway between the plan to partition Palestine and a plan to cut 
immigration.  Because of their inability to remain true to one course of action, the British 
lost control of the situation in Palestine, and the two communities became more unruly 
and stubbornly defiant than ever before.42  The desired end state for each group was 
polarizing, resulting in little remaining common ground. 
D. NON-COOPERATION 
The inquiries of the commissions resulted in an order to examine land settlement 
and immigration.  The Hope-Simpson Commission report was issued accompanied by the 
Passfield White Paper, which stated that there was not enough cultivable land in Palestine 
with the current population.  It proposed that immigration should cease until better 
irrigation and cultivation methods were in place.  The White Paper continued, pointing 
out that the Jewish Agency policy of only employing Jews was a violation of Article 6 of 
the Mandate, which ensured that “the rights and positions of other sections of the 
population are not prejudiced.”43 The report caused a storm of protest from Zionist 
groups.  Weizmann immediately used his contacts to meet with Prime Minister 
MacDonald where he played on the Prime Minister’s insecurity as a minority 
government, and his fears that Weizmann could pressure the American government to 
“bring economic sanctions against Great Britain.”44  MacDonald capitulated to 
Weizmann’s threats and issued a letter repudiating the White Paper.  Arabs referred to 
MacDonald’s letter as the “Black Letter” because it would become the basis for policy in 
Palestine.  The British reversed policy rather than side against the Zionists to enforce it.45   
                                                 
41 Fitzsimons, p. 34. 
42 Monroe, p. 80-81. 
43 Seton-Williams, p. 132. 
44 Smith, p. 92. 
45 Monroe, p. 81. 
23 
  Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner on the ground in Palestine since 
1931, tried to create a legislative council acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, but met with 
little success. The Prime Minister's assurance to the Zionists of parity countered his 
proposals for a proportionally represented structure.  Attempts to progress politically 
stagnated.  By 1932, the Arabs refused to cooperate with the Jews in every field, 
resigning from official posts and founding political parties of their own, such as the 
Muslim Congress.46  Arab nationalism grew and for the first time, their newly formed 
political parties united to present their gr ievances to the High Commissioner.  The Arab 
leaders attempted to make a conciliatory gesture and did not reject a proposal for a new 
legislative council, but Jews denounced it.   
The largest affront to the Arabs came when Weizmann announced to Wauchope 
that the Colonial Office would open TransJordan for Jewish settlement and grant 
additional immigration certificates for German refugees.47  Even the Palestinian officials 
were unaware of the impending policy announcement, demonstrating the level of contact 
between the Zionists and ranking officials in London.  In January 1936, the Colonial 
Office, responding to Arab demands from the previous autumn, acknowledged that a new 
constitution was a "practical step towards democratic government." However, when the 
British Houses of Lords and Commons debated the proposals the next month, Jewish 
members of both houses argued against the demands, while the Arab position was never 
presented.  "It was obvious that the project had again been killed by the Jewish 
opposition."48 
Up to this point, the ranking Muslim leader, Haj Amin a-Husayni, the Mufti of 
Jerusalem, had promoted a civil relationship with the British, and their pro-Zionist stance.  
The British thought of him as loyal and willing to cooperate with the government.49  Yet, 
even his calls to maintain the peace could not contain Arab outrage.  The Supreme Arab 
Strike Committee (later known as the Arab Higher Committee) was formed within days, 
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renewing the Arab demands for a halt to immigration, a stop to Jewish land purchases 
and self-government.  The Mufti begrudgingly assumed the leadership position of the 
movement.  The strike threatened to paralyze the country, removing all Arab officials 
from government service, transportation posts and many trades.50  Wauchope, who tried 
to maintain a diplomatic dialogue with both Jews and leading Arabs, had to act against 
those who called for the strike.  Official British policy was pro-Zionist, but division 
among local British governors brought the issue to public view.  Arab anger with the 
administration over immigration issues turned violent and for the first time, the Arabs 
were directing their anger at the government, not just the Jews.   
For his role as the figurehead of the Arab movement, the Mufti lost favor with the 
British government.  He was stripped of his office and forced to flee from Palestine when 
threatened with arrest.51  The British lost one of their biggest supporters in the Muslim 
community, but the government refused to suspend immigration, and actually called for 
an increase to the normal quota over the next six months.  Although, in an attempt to 
smooth the blow, the British announced that they would appoint a Royal Commission to 
investigate grievances once there was a restoration of order.   Yet, order was not restored, 
primarily because from 1922 to 1939, the percentage of Jews in the Palestinian 
population rose from 11 to 29 percent.  Arabs feared that the progression of Jewish 
immigration would never stop with the current British policy. 52  The High Commissioner 
reinforced the military in response to the unrest and although reluctant to use force, 
enacted Emergency Regulations, which frequently squashed civil rights and used 
collective punishment against Arab communities.  In the port of Jaffa, Wauchope ordered 
the demolition of 250 houses near where suspected Arab snipers were operating.53     
The arrival of additional British military reinforcements and the intervention of 
inter-Arab diplomacy ended the strike.  The strike dissolved in time for the harvest 
season, despite the fact that it failed to achieve its objectives; but the general revolt 
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continued.54  The Royal Commission (Peel) Report admitted that the causes of the 
current disturbances were essentially the same as those that caused the riots in 1921-1922 
and 1933.  Repeatedly, the desire for Arab independence, and the fear that intense Zionist 
lobbying would lead to a Jewish state, caused civil unrest.   
In Arab views, the Jews benefited from unequal access to the British government.  
They were afforded representation in greater numbers than their proportion of the 
population would warrant, and they received military/police training.  Additionally, the 
WZO raised considerable funds to finance their land purchases and immigration, and it 
was able to use its lobby power for direct access to London for policy issues.  Peel 
admitted, for the first time, that promises made to the Jews and Arabs were 
"irreconcilable" and recommended partitioning Palestine.55  The British statement of 
response agreed with the Peel Report findings, but Arab leaders viewed it as just another 
reversal of rhetoric and were more interested in the terms of the proposed Jewish state.        
The turning point of the revolt came in September 1937, when a high-ranking 
Mandate official was murdered.  The British responded with force.  Lewis Andrews, who 
was responsible for brokering land deals between Jews and Arabs, was the first British 
official killed in the conflicts.56  His death was symbolic of the Arab disapproval of 
abundant land sales to Jews.  In the aftermath of the murder, the Arab Higher Committee 
was declared illegal and the Arabs’ most significant institution of political unity was 
destroyed.  The officers of the Committee were arrested or exiled because they 
supposedly instigated the violence in the community, and the leadership of the Arab 
movement was effectively silenced.  The recognition they hoped for as leaders in the 
community gave way to a reputation of violent extremists.  Martial law resulted in 
Palestine with military courts whose sentences could not be appealed.  The British civil 
administration had lost control of the villages and the insurrection spread across the 
countryside.57  The resistance movement now had the support of the entire Arab 
population and it continued despite the absence of its leaders.   
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Before the great Arab strike and ensuing revolt, Jewish Palestinians were almost 
completely reliant on the British police forces for protection.  The Jewish militia, the 
Haganah, formed in 1921, was a small defensive fo rce that protected Jewish settlements 
and sections of towns.  Over the years since its formation, Jews accused the Mandate 
government of failing to protect them from Arab attacks.  Therefore, the British ignored 
the formation of Haganah, which was officially illegal.  The Jews also used their 
positions in the gendarmerie to gain military training and steal weapons, which they took 
back to their towns to fortify the Haganah.  The increase of Arab attacks on Jews during 
the revolt resulted in Jewish retaliation.58  Further, Arab insurgency actions directed at 
the Mandatory government influenced the British to side with the Jews.  While publicly 
against the actions of Haganah, the British military used the Jews to collect intelligence 
on Arab strongholds and planned raids.  The British Army trained Jewish units in night 
fighting and surprise attacks, and provided Haganah with information of Arab rebel 
plans, in exchange for intelligence on activities of the Arab Higher Committee.  Again, 
the Arab actions against the British and the pro-Zionist attitudes of ranking British 
officers provided the Jews with the advantage of public support and access to resources.   
In 1938, the British government again reversed positions.  The approval of the 
partition plan delineated in the Peel Report was rescinded when both Jews and Arabs 
voiced opposition to it and a second Royal Commission found that it would be impossible 
to implement.59  As the Arab rebellion continued, the British postponed the decision on 
partition until one more conference could be held to try to reach a compromise with the 
Jewish and Arab participants.  Leaders from several Arab countries, the Palestinian Arabs 
and the Jewish Agency traveled to London for the Round Table Conference in February 
1939.  Talks broke down almost immediately when "Arabs refused to sit at the same 
conference table as the Jewish delegation."60   
At the conclusion of the fruitless conference in early 1939, Britain issued the 
latest in their succession of White Papers, containing new government proposals.  The 
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document set “unprecedented” limits on immigration and land sales to Jews, and 
discussed an independent Palestinian State.   
[This was the] first official British attempt to [reconcile] the two halves of 
the Balfour Declaration – the half which gave British blessing to a Jewish 
National home, and the second half that said ‘it being clearly understood 
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious 
rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine.’61   
For both groups concerned, the White Paper was a disappointment.  The Arabs 
were not entirely against the proposal, but ultimately rejected it because it did not 
immediately cease all immigration, as they demanded.  It was affective, in that “it helped 
secure enough Arab compliance to tide Great Britain over the war years.”62  For the Jews, 
the reaction was stronger.  They saw the White Paper as a “severe, almost mortal 
blow.”63  They took the statement as an act of betrayal from the British of their obligation 
and rejected it  
on the grounds that it constituted a violation of international law, namely 
the League of Nations mandate, which they believed obligated the British 
to use its authority on behalf of Zionist goals.64              
The Zionists immediately called on their contacts in America to put pressure on 
the British to reverse the policy.  They had successfully secured reversals to British 
policy in the past, so they believed it would be possible in this instance as well.  In the 
meantime, “the restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine at a time of extreme 
anti-Semitism in Nazi-dominated Europe led the Haganah to facilitate illegal 
immigration.”65  In the last year before the war, nearly 35,000 Jews arrived in Palestine 
illegally.  This figure represented three times the number legally permitted, but even 
when they were discovered, illegal immigrants were rarely deported.66  The Jewish 
leaders called on the British to rescind the White Paper. 
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E. TEMPORARY TRUCE 
In mid-1939, the Permanent Mandates Commission met to discuss the recent 
British policy statements.  “By a vote of four to three it was decided that these [policy 
statements] appeared to be inconsistent with the text of the Mandate.” 67   However, 
before any action could be taken to reconsider the proposal, Britain was swept into the 
war in Europe. The war absorbed the interest of the world, and for a time, the Jews and 
Arab leaders alike called for a truce with the British.  The British knew that their policies 
in the 1939 White Paper angered the Zionists, while failing to appease the Arabs.  
However, they were willing to accept the long-term ramifications of this, in exchange for 
being able to temporarily stabilize their position in the Arab world and refocus their 
attention to the war effort.68   
Jewish leaders around the world united behind the British attempt to defeat the 
Nazis, but they were also determined to change the latest British policy for Palestine.  At 
the outbreak of the war, the Jewish slogan was “fight the White Paper as if there were no 
war, and the war as if there were no White Paper.”69  Eager to participate in a useful way, 
and fearing a possible invasion of Palestine by the Germans, Haganah forces volunteered 
for service with the British Army.  The British provided them with weapons and training, 
and used them for intelligence gathering in Vichy French ruled Syria.70  They were also 
trained in bomb making and sabotage work behind enemy lines, to be used in case of a 
German invasion.  Again, the symbiotic relationship that had flour ished between the Jews 
and the British for so many years in Palestine reemerged.  The British provided the Jews 
with tangible benefits in exchange for their participation, and more importantly, their lack 
of disruption. 
The mutually beneficial arrangement would not survive through the course of the 
war, however.  The British would not bend on the immigration restrictions.  Illegal 
immigrants were getting into the country, but the British did what they could to prevent 
ships with illegals on board from landing.  In February 1942, the Struma sank at sea and 
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all of its nearly 800 passengers drowned.71  The Jews were furious and blamed the British 
for the loss of lives.  By the next year, when the threat of invasion by Rommel’s army 
was quelled, and revelations of the atrocities being committed on the Jews of Europe 
were spread, the Jewish community “turned on the British, and blamed them.”72  The 
wartime truce between Britain and the Jews of Palestine was, for all intents and purposes, 
over.   
In May 1942, the Zionists sponsored a conference in New York.  The “Biltmore 
Programme” resolved that Palestine should be established as a Jewish Commonwealth, 
with unlimited immigration in the control of the Jewish Agency and the creation of a 
Jewish Army.  The Zionist devotion to securing a Jewish state hindered the British war 
effort and further strained the relations between Jewish groups and the Palestinian 
government.73  Additionally, the British discovered that Haganah members trained by the 
British Army were training others in the use of explosives and sabotage equipment.   The 
wartime truce had ended and the Jews were “prepared to use all the opportunities that the 
war and Britain’s necessities gave them.”74 
F. POST WAR DEVELOPMENTS 
By the time the war ended, the pro-Zionist Labor Party was in power in Britain, 
and the Zionist lobby established a strong sentiment in America that supported Palestine 
as a Jewish state.   The Zionists in the United States waged a highly effective propaganda 
campaign against the British, claiming that they were reneging on promises made to the 
Jews.  American leaders in both political parties announced support for unlimited Jewish 
immigration into Palestine and ultimately a democratic Jewish Commonwealth.  Based 
on the United States’ interest, Britain suggested that an Anglo-American Committee form 
to create recommendations for the disposition of Palestine.  They agreed that the 
“political aspirations of the two communities in Palestine were irreconcilable, [and] there 
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was little hope of establishing a unitary government.”  Therefore, they renewed the 
endorsement for partition. 75   
After the war, British power in the Middle East declined, leaving the British to 
question its next move in Palestine, now that it was clear that the issue would likely have 
to conclude with force.  The British dependence on Arab controlled oil and their 
commitment to a Jewish homeland created a paradox in their policy actions.  While the 
British wavered in support of the American proposal to admit 100,000 additional Jews to 
Palestine, right wing Jewish political groups, such as Irgun and the Stern Gang called for 
open rebellion against the Mandate government.  They carried out indiscriminate 
bombings, killed soldiers, and kidnapped British officers.  The already sour relations 
between the Mandate and the Jews deepened to open hostility after Irgun blew up the 
British administrative offices in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing ninety-one 
people.76  Even the Jewish Agency condemned Irgun’s actions.     
In February 1947, the London Conference met with representatives of the Arab 
States and Jewish Agency and dissolved without reaching any agreements.  When the 
Jewish delegation refused to participate, it was “clear that no solution could be reached 
that would be acceptable to both parties.”  The British government felt that it had done all 
it could, and decided to submit the issue to the United Nations for resolution. 77   In fact, 
the British never took a strong stand against the Jewish terrorism because they could 
never amass good intelligence of the Jewish actions and they were not willing to bring 
their military power to bear on the Jews, for fear of images of comparison to the Nazis.     
The British Colonial Secretary announced that if the Jews and Arabs could not 
reach a settlement agreement then British forces would withdraw from the Mandate.78  
They hoped for a renewed authority from the UN to continue the presence in Palestine, 
but the UN appointed a Special Committee of Inquiry to give advice instead. The 
committee was pleased to find Jewish Agency representatives willing to compromise, and 
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straying from the Biltmore Programme claims to all of Mandatory Palestine.79  The 
Special Committee members ultimately called for the end of the Mandate and the 
internationalization of Jerusalem.  The final component of the recommendation, the 
partition plan, caused the most debate. 80   Plans for the two states also required a ten-year 
economic union intended to raise the fiscal and cultural level of the Arabs to equal that of 
the Jews.81  
The UN committee did not address any method of implementation for its plan.  In 
general, their proposal was as vague in its language as the British had been in many of 
their "White Papers."  The reactions from the parties involved to the UN decision were 
not especially positive. The Jewish portion of the population had the most favorable 
response to the committee actions, but even they did not approve of the plan for 
economic union.  The Arab Higher Committee announced that they rejected the partition 
report entirely.82  The British shirked at the partition solution each time it surfaced 
because of the problems envisioned with enforcing it.  They pointed out that they were 
not prepared to enact a UN decision, which was not acceptable to either side, by force.  
Since there was no provision for enforcement of the UN proposal, the British decided that 
the Mandatory government would end before the withdrawal of forces. 83 
The date for the end of the Mandate was set as May 15, 1948.  From this period, 
the situation in Palestine deteriorated rapidly.  The UN had underestimated Arab 
opposition to the plan and the Jews adopted an aggressive scheme to defend the area 
planned as a Jewish state.  Any semblance of law and order disintegrated.  The British 
concentrated the bulk of their military to protect the Mandatory officials withdrawing 
from Palestine.  Looting, rioting and killing were rampant as Palestine entered a virtual 
civil war.  The Arabs, who lacked unity and organization, were just concentrating their 
efforts on attacks of the Jews, but the Jewish community had a larger focus - that of state 
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building.  The Jewish Agency transferred to London and a "transitional government and a 
parliament" were formed.84  The Jewish community had a carefully thought out plan to 
transition from a community under the Mandate to their own Jewish state.  The Jewish 
"Plan D" contained plans to step into government institutions and services, and raise 
funds worldwide.  The morale and motivation of the Jewish community were monitored 
as well.  The Jews in Palestine were prepared and ready to declare their independence on 
May 15, 1948.  "More importantly, [they] benefited from the absence of similar 
preparations on the Palestinian and the Arab side."85 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
When David Ben Gurion announced the creation of the Independent State of 
Israel, the United States immediately recognized it.  This proclamation was the 
culminating moment of years of preparation by the Jewish community in Palestine and 
the Zionist organization worldwide.  The external Zionist lobby, under the direction of 
Chaim Weizmann, worked diligently, especially in England and the United States to 
garner support for the Zionist dream of a national home for the Jews in Palestine.86  They 
raised huge sums of money to finance the immigration of Jews to Palestine, and 
purchased land to ensure their settlement.  Additionally, the support they raised within 
high levels of British government influenced the Mandatory policies in Palestine.  The 
Jews benefited from British acceptance of their inclusion in government posts and the 
specific military training and access to weapons that were later beneficial to their armed 
struggle against the Arabs.  The British Mandate policy laid the foundation for the 
outcomes in Palestine.  The amount of immigration allowed under British rule increased 
Jewish percentages of the population, thereby decreasing Arab representative influence 
proportionally.  The British protected Zionist interests during their most vulnerable 
period, the 1920s and 30s, which provided the Jews with an opportunity to establish a 
political structure of their own within the structure of the Mandate government.  The 
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internal labor movement and the creation of the Histadrut then bound individual Jewish 
reliance on the Jewish community structure and united their population.       
The successful outcome of independence for the Jews was a blow to the 
Palestinian Arabs, who just three decades earlier had a clear dominance, socially and 
politically, in the region.  The Arab actions under Mandatory rule were detrimental to 
their perceived ability to manage government and political organization.   When the 
British tried to involve the Jews and Arabs in their political system, the Arabs routinely 
refused.  The Arabs could not come to a consensus on their position for a desired end 
state and had no significant organized leadership, especially after the Mufti was exiled.  
The economic and psychological differences of the Arabs did not fit into the structure set 
up by the British.  They showed no interest in accepting the Jewish minority and 
incorporating them in the Arab structure.  This attitude was contrary to that of the 
international community, specifically the US and Europe’s interest in a home for the 
Jews.  Therefore, their reputation suffered in western eyes.  Further, the Arabs had no 
lobby group to represent them, unlike the Jews, who had the World Zionist Organization 
and others.   
The Arabs were never united in their outlook on the Jewish problem.  Their 
internal strife divided their efforts, and after the suppression of the Arab Revolt, the 
rebellion was never the same.  They had no effective military preparation for the discord 
that they faced, with the Jews and very few international resources, either in the form of 
pledged support or money for weapons.  They viewed the conflict as a local issue, but the 
Jews saw it as vital to their international survival.  The Jews were willing to risk 
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This chapter analyzes British response to political violence and examines the 
differences between their reactions to Jewish violence versus Arab violence.  It considers 
the reputation that the Arabs assumed as the aggressors of the Jewish/Arab conflict 
because they were the first group to use political violence.  It presents the British as 
sympathetic to Jewish use of violence as a form of self-defense and biased in their 
punishment of Arab actions.      
A. ROUND ONE  
Just as the military government was about to be replaced by a civil administration, 
Palestine erupted in its first major display of Arab dissatisfaction with the Zionists.  This 
was not the first sign for the British that there was a widening rift between the Zionist 
aims and the indigenous Arab population.  On the first anniversary of the Balfour 
Declaration, in November 1918, there had been clashes between Arabs and Jews on a 
smaller scale.  The disturbances prompted a petition to be sent to the British outlining the 
Arab disapproval of “Zionist immigration and the idea that Palestine was to belong to the 
Jews and not to the Arab population.”87   
Thus began a pattern of political actions that would pervade throughout the 
Mandate administration for the duration of the 1920s.  British politicians in London, 
sympathetic to Jewish needs and political considerations instructed the Mandate 
government officials to back policies benefiting the Zionists.  The officials in Palestine, 
however, were often sympathetic to the Arabs’ position because they witnessed the 
aggressive and contentious demands of the Zionists, who threatened to appeal to London 
if they were not fully appeased.   Nevertheless, the local governors were obligated to 
follow the policies delineated by London.  The Arabs, then, would voice their disapproval 
of the policies, either diplomatically or violently, and then the pattern would repeat. 
The first Sunday in April 1920 simultaneously marked religious holidays for each 
of the religions of the Book.  The Orthodox Easter, Passover and Nebi Musa, the 
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“Muslim procession to a shrine associated with Moses,” all occurred in the same week 
and brought masses of people to Jerusalem for the events.88  The Zionist Commission 
warned the British that they had reason to believe that there would be Arab attacks on 
Jews following the celebration.  However, the same concerns had been raised to the 
British just before the 1919 Nebi Musa, and the date passed without incident.  The 
British, therefore, were not overly alarmed and felt that they had enough forces on hand 
to be prepared for any outbursts that might occur.  They were wrong. 
The events occurring in the Middle East in the weeks just prior to Nebi Musa may 
have further instigated the hostilities.  An Arab terrorist group called the Black Hand was 
conducting random attacks on Jews to discourage their settlement in Palestine.  
Additionally, Faisal had been crowned king of an independent Arab country in Syria, and 
the passions of Arab nationalism had been growing. 89  When a minor disturbance broke 
out it quickly escalated into a full-scale riot, which would continue for three days.  The 
British had underestimated the level of dissatisfaction the Arabs had been feeling, and 
overestimated their own power to control the region. 
Although they had plenty of warning, the British were, nonetheless, unprepared to 
quash the rioting.  Looting, vandalism, rapes and murders occurred even after martial law 
was declared.  The Revisionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky, who had been publicly training 
Jews in self-defense measure for the past several weeks, wanted to use his defense group.  
The British ultimately decided to swear his men in as deputies, but the violence calmed 
before this action was necessary.  In the end, five Jews and four Arabs were dead, nearly 
250 people were injured, and the ego of the British military governor was bruised 
because the leader of the Zionist Commission insisted on referring to the unfortunate 
event as a pogrom.90       
After the disturbances, a Military Commission investigated the cause of the 
outbreak.  It found that the Arabs were disappointed in what they felt was the “non-
fulfillment of war promises of independence,” and the fear that the Balfour  Declaration 
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pledge to establish “a Jewish home would lead to Arab subjection.”91  These factors, in 
addition to the growth of Arab nationalism since the war, resulted in the emotional 
outbursts that were displayed in the riots.  The Arab complaints were no t a revelation to 
the British.  Their concerns had been voiced before, and Arabs often quit their jobs in the 
British administration as a sign of protest, but the degree to which their hostility was 
shown in this situation surprised the British.  In time, their attitude of resentment would 
be directed at the British as well, and would foreshadow the anti-government action that 
would occur in the 1936 rebellion.   
The British reacted quickly to thwart the violence, but according to the Zionists, 
not quickly enough.  Many Zionist blamed the British for the events, if not directly, then 
at least for the degree to which they continued.  The British attempted to bring justice to 
Palestine for the attacks through judicial means, but by then, their actions were met with 
disdain more than appreciation.  Some 200 people were ordered to stand trial for their 
roles in the Nebi Musa violence, including 39 Jews.  
There was no parity in the sentences, however.  The Arabs were clearly seen as 
the aggressors in the situation and Jewish militants, like Jabotinsky, who were arrested 
for weapons possession and disturbing the peace, became symbols of the injustice Jews 
had to withstand.  In fact, Jabotinsky received significantly better treatment than any of 
his Arab prisoner counterparts.  Governor Ronald Storrs personally went to check that 
Jabotinsky was being properly treated and brought clothing and other items to him in jail.  
Meanwhile, Haj Amin al-Husayni and Aref al-Aref, leaders in the Arab cause, were 
forced to flee before they were each sentenced to ten year terms for inciting the riots.92  
Furthermore, Governor Storrs dismissed Jerusalem’s mayor, Musa Kazim al-Husayni, for 
his role in the events and appointed his rival, Raghib al-Nashshashibi, as his relief. 93  
While the change in office was largely symbolic, it did cause a further fragmentation of 
the nationalist and political activity of the Arab cause.   
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The court of inquiry appointed to investigate and report on the riots found that the 
“overconfidence” Governor Storrs had of the police force’s ability to preserve order was 
responsible for the resulting violence.  By the time the report was signed, however, the 
military administration had been summarily dismissed and replaced by a civil 
administration. The hope in London was that “the civil administration would be more 
effective and less inflammatory than the military forces.”94  When the Zionists learned 
that Herbert Samuel was appointed as the first High Commissioner of the civilian 
administration on July 1, 1920, Chaim Weizmann, the leader of the World Zionist 
Organization, told his wife that, “our trials have come to an end.”  Later that same month, 
the French ejected Faisal’s government in Syria and Arab hopes of an independent 
country encompassing Palestine dimmed.  The Arabs were left with British rule 
determined to fulfill its promises to the Zionists.  One British military official astutely 
observed, “All faith in British honesty and justice has gone from the Arabs of the Near 
East.”95      
B. IN WITH BOTH FEET  
Herbert Samuel came to Palestine as both a British official and a Jew.  He 
understood his obligation to address Arab grievances, but he was also a supporter of the 
Zionist movement and he wanted to ensure that British policy fulfilled its obligation to 
assis t Zionist goals.96  His first order of business was to attempt to be pleasant to all 
sides.  He visited Arab villages, Christian communities and Zionist settlements 
frequently.  He saw to the immediate release of Jabotinsky, and pardoned two senior 
Arab figures.  Later, when asked by local Arabs in TransJordan, he rescinded the 
convictions of Haj Amin al-Husayni and Aref al-Aref as well.97  He hoped to gain Arab 
participation in the Mandate government and to preserve their rights while convincing 
them of the benefits of a pro-Zionist policy.  As a measure of good faith, he agreed to 
allow the appointment of Haj Amin al-Husayni as the Mufti of Jerusalem.  The Husaynis 
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were a prominent notable family known for their cooperation with the British and he 
hoped that this appointment would result in better relations with the Arabs.98    
Samuel believed that he could institute conditions under which the Zionists could 
flourish.  Yet, he would have to exercise patience, because as the War Office was quick 
to point out, “Palestine [was] of no military value from an imperial point of view,” and 
the crown had no intention of footing the bill for the Mandate.”99  The Zionists 
understood that the speed of their development would depend on their ability to raise the 
funds needed to support their goals.  Samuel, for his part, was willing to provide as many 
immigration permits to the Zionists as they were able to use.  Several of the enthusiastic, 
young workers of the third aliyah had already begun to arrive in Palestine, eager to help 
build the Zionist community.             
The penniless workers of this new wave of immigration had socialist ideals that 
were often at odds with other workers.  In May 1921, workers parading for a Soviet 
Palestine clashed with the labor party workers.  The inter-Jewish discord spread to 
neighboring Arab communities and Arab-Jewish clashes were immediately renewed.  
The disturbances dissipated briefly, only to begin with the Nebi Musa celebration again.  
Between the two outbursts, 90 Jews and 62 Arabs were killed and over 300 were 
wounded.100  The administration declared a state of emergency and the suspension of 
immigration.  In the past the Zionists had “always taken the position that Arabs and Jews 
could live together peaceably in Palestine.”101  While they tried to profess that these 
events were isolated clashes and their claim was still true in principle, Samuel suspected 
otherwise.   
As an attempt to voice their disapproval of the Zionist agenda, the Arabs once 
more turned to violence.  Again, as was the case after the Nebi Musa riots the previous 
year, this tactic failed.  In 1920, the Arabs called for the Balfour Declaration to be 
revoked. However, the outbreak of disturbances only resulted in furthering the British 
resolve, and the Declaration was inc luded in the text of the Mandate charter.  After this 
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most recent round of violence, the reaction to the Arabs demands resulted in political 
losses for the Arabs.  Because of the events in Jaffa, the Jewish districts and neighboring 
Tel Aviv were not restricted in any way.  Just the opposite occurred, Tel Aviv received 
municipal autonomy. 102  The Jews were now able to make their own decisions in Tel 
Aviv.  It was the first step towards achieving their goal of autonomy throughout 
Palestine. 
Haj Amin al-Husayni, now the Mufti of Jerusalem, recognized that violence did 
little to further the Arab cause.  Once an advocate of the use of terror against Zionism, he 
took a more moderate stance against violence and worked to prevent future rioting.  The 
Mufti was “an avid nationalist,” but he was also “a moderate man” who wanted to defend 
the political status quo. 103  While Musa Kazim al-Husayni, the former mayor of 
Jerusalem, managed political affairs for the Palestinian Arab Executive, the Mufti 
focused his efforts to maintain the peace in Palestine throughout the 1920s.   
The Mufti, like Kazim, opposed both the Advisory Council and the Legislative 
Council Samuel had hoped to establish.  Samuel wanted to create a legislative body that 
would represent and take into consideration the views of different segments of the 
population in Palestine.  The second council proposed favored the Muslims slightly more 
than the first, but it was still not proportionally representative.  The councils significantly 
underrepresented the Muslim community and were barred from discussing British 
obligations to the Zionists.104  A later proposal by the British to create an Arab Agency 
was met with little enthusiasm.  The Arab Agency members would be appointed by the 
High Commissioner and would not be allowed to discuss Zionist policies, which was the 
greatest item of interest for the Arab community.  The Arabs could not support such an 
organization, and the British were tired of trying to bring the Arabs into an administrative 
government that they would not support.  This would be the last major effort the British 
would make to include Arab leaders in the Mandate government.  
                                                 
101 Segev, p. 180. 
102 Ibid, p. 183. 
103 Mattar, p. 230. 
104 Smith, p. 73. 
41 
Out of principle, the Arabs would not participate with the Mandate government.  
To do so would mean giving official recognition to the authority of the Mandate, the 
charter of which recognized the Balfour Declaration and the rights of the Jews to 
immigrate to Palestine.  The Arabs’ disagreement with the premise of the Balfour 
Declaration was the basis for their political non-participation.  Unfortunately, by taking 
this position, the Arabs disadvantaged themselves from the one arena in which they might 
have their views heard.  The Arabs had the support of the British military, but they 
needed the backing of the policy makers in Palestine.  A good rapport with the local 
administrators may have been their only real chance to counteract the influence the 
Zionists had with the British government in London.   
Chaim Weizmann the leader of the World Zionist Organization, now based in 
London, worked tirelessly to raise awareness and funds for the Zionist cause.  He 
developed a unique ability to be granted private audiences with some of the most 
influential members of the British government, and found himself in a position to 
influence policy and ask for the government’s consideration of various issues.  For 
example, after the most recent violent episode, several rioters were brought to trial.  One 
Arab was sentenced to 15 years in jail, but when three Jews were convicted of 
participating in the murder of Arabs, the Jewish community objected.  Because of his 
political influence with the government on behalf of the Zionists, the case was forwarded 
to the Supreme Court, where the men were acquitted on appeal, on the grounds of self-
defense.105      
The Arabs were angry about the preferential treatment the Jews were given, and 
were equally as unhappy with Jewish land purchases as they were with Jewish 
immigration.  Organizations like the Jewish National Fund and the American Zionist 
Commonwealth purchased as much land as they could to establish Jewish settlements in 
Palestine.  Legally, they had done nothing wrong, but their purchases further aggravated 
the already tense situation in the region.  The problem stemmed from an historical 
distrust the Arabs had of registering ownership of their land.  When the Ottomans began a 
process of modernization in the last century, reformers borrowed several concepts from 
                                                 
105 Segev, p. 194, 188-9. 
42 
the West.  One such policy was legal titles to property for landholders.  The Arabs were 
very skeptical of the policy because they thought it was a ploy; registering their families 
would lead to conscription of their sons into the Ottoman army.106   Consequently, few 
landholders were registered with titles to their lands.   
Often absentee, wealthy urban Arabs “owned” the land, while the farmers had to 
pay “rent” on the land they cultivated.  The landlords, with no personal ties to the land, 
saw land ownership as a business.  They had the power to sell the land as they chose, 
often to the highest bidder.  In selling to the Jewish groups, many Arab tenant farmers 
were evicted from the land their families had worked for generations.  In the al-Fula 
village “only one quarter of the one hundred Arab families who had lived in the area left 
of their own free will.”107    The Supreme Muslim Council tried to stop the sale to the 
Jews, and even offered to purchase the land for the same price the Jews had offered, but 
the sale went through as planned.   
When the Jews went to occupy their newly acquired land, the British were there 
to defend them.  The Arab farmers threw stones at the Jews to show their resentment of 
the outcome, but then a Jew shot at the protesters and an Arab was killed.  The Jews were 
arrested, charged with murder and convicted.  However, as was becoming common in 
Jewish convictions, their sentences were overturned on appeal.  The Arabs saw no justice, 
but rather irony, in what was happening to them.  “The Jews, after centuries of 
persecution, wanted to live in a land of their own, where they could be free from fear and 
develop under their own institutions.  Unfortunately, the land to which they wished to 
move was already fully populated by another race.  As a result, the Zionists invaded 
Palestine and drove the Arabs from their homes and country.”108  The Palestinian Arabs 
disapproved of the increased Jewish immigration and land purchases, but they were 
powerless to prevent it.  They knew that the Jews had the support of the British, and the 
administration policies were drafted accordingly. 
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C. ROUND TWO 
During the bulk of the 1920s, Arab politics were relatively quiet.  Of course, 
minor conflicts occurred, but years passed since the widespread riots that followed Nebi 
Musa in 1920 and 1921.  In this decade, the British effectively implemented a “divide 
and rule strategy” vis-à-vis the Arabs.  They helped perpetuate tribal- familial rivalries by 
ensuring that neither the Husayni nor Nashshashibi families had unchecked power in the 
Arab community.  The Jews, meanwhile, continued to develop organizations to continue 
immigration and land purchases.  The British, therefore, were optimistic that the Mandate 
would be successful and that they could resolve the incompatibility between Arab 
demands and Zionist aspirations.  Their positive outlook continued because  
Arab refusal to consider anything short of Arab dominion over a Jewish 
minority was written off as local non-cooperation, and never seen as a 
manifestation of the wider kind of Arab nationalism [such as was seen in 
Syria].109   
The unyielding demands for Arab supremacy, without building the institutions to realize 
this goal, would work against the Arabs over the course of the Mandate and leave them 
with even less than they were willing to concede to the Zionists. 
Conditions in the Mandate were going so smoothly that the British reduced the 
number of troops they had in the region by a considerable amount.  The Arabs, moreover, 
appeared ready to embrace the government because they had petitioned for an elected 
Parliament in 1928 and 1929.110  The Zionists grew ever more confident and began to 
publicly display their political power.  They took greater steps to show their national and 
religious pride, too, by bringing more accompaniments with them for prayer sessions at 
the Western Wall.  The wall, a religious relic from Herod’s temple, was a holy site for the 
Jews, but it also marked the perimeter of the third holiest site in Islam, with religious 
significance of its own. 111    
For generations the wall was maintained by a Muslim religious foundation, which 
took no issue with Jews praying at the wall.  However, they did not approve of the 
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alterations the Jews were making to the site, such as bringing chairs for the elderly and 
screens to separate male and female worshipers.  The Muslim’s true concern was not for 
the additions, but rather the fear that any concessions they made to the status quo would 
only amount to demands for more concessions.  As far as the Muslims were concerned, 
the Jews crossed the line on Yom Kippur 1928.  They brought a screen to the wall that 
was so large that it blocked a nearby alley the Arabs routinely used.  The Arabs protested 
to the British immediately.  The British informed the Jews that they could keep the screen 
for the rest of the holiday, but it would have to be removed by the following day.  When 
it remained in place the next day, further Arab complaints caused the British to go and 
forcibly remove the screen.  Jewish rhetoric swiftly protested the action of the British and 
denounced the Muslims as people akin to the Russians of the pogroms.   
Muslim response to the disparaging remarks and Jewish demands for control of 
the wall came when the Mufti, now head of the Supreme Muslim Council, called the 
Muslim community to be alerted to the threat to the wall.  “The incident sparked a series 
of protests on the part of the Arabs, including proclamations, telegrams to the League of 
Nations, and a one hour general strike.”112  The Mufti also began to assert Muslim 
authority over the wall by undertaking some minor building projects.  Yet, when Muslims 
took physical moves to stop the activities at the wall, the British did not see their 
justification.  Two young Arabs that harassed a Jewish cleric as he was putting out chairs 
at the wall were imprisoned after an unusually speedy trial.   
The verbal bickering continued throughout the next year, but in July 1929, when 
the Mufti began another building project, Zionist fury could not be suppressed.  A 
Revisionist youth group “marched to the wall, raised the Zionist flag and sang the Zionist 
anthem.”  The next day, after Muslim Sabbath prayers, thousands of Arabs went to the 
wall and burned the prayers inserted into it.113  By the following Friday, there were 
rumors that the Jews were going to attack the mosque.  The Mufti urged the crowd to 
remain calm and return to their villages, but apparently, his presence only further incited 
the assembly.114  Increasing Arab fears of Jewish intentions sparked a major outbreak of 
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violence.  Arabs swarmed into Jewish quarters and began attacking any Jew in their 
paths.  The British police were all but helpless to prevent the bloodbath.  The military had 
been reduced in numbers and the British naively thought the mostly Arab police force 
would act in accordance with their job requirements above their personal, religious 
affiliations.       
The unrest continued for nearly a week; it spread from Jerusalem to other towns, 
most significantly Hebron, where over 60 mostly unarmed Orthodox Jews were killed.  
The British police force was too weak to prevent the violence so they called in 
reinforcements from Egypt and TransJordan.  Nonetheless, despite the additional troops, 
the atrocities continued until they had run their course.  Not all of the country’s Arabs 
had participated in the attacks.  In fact, the majority of Hebron’s Jews had been spared 
because their Arab neighbors hid them in their homes.  The attacks were based on 
Muslim fears that the Jews were going to “violate the sanctity of Islam.” 115  To a degree, 
this fear proved to be true.  Some Jews were found to have gone beyond the limits of self-
defense and vandalized mosques, burning sacred books.  
When the riots finally subsided, 133 Jews and 116 Arabs were dead; 571 others 
were injured.116  In the aftermath, High Commissioner Sir John Chancellor ordered trials 
for persons suspected of committing murder, both Jews and Arabs.  He demanded that the 
“courts maintain at least the appearance of holding Jews and Arabs equally culpable.” 117  
The Chief Justice of Palestine, Sir Michael McDonnell, was willing to follow through 
with the tasking but questioned the bias of the Jewish, and Zionist supporting, Attorney 
General, Norman Bentwich.  When the Attorney General did not want to resign, the 
Arabs got rid of him the old fashioned way; a young Arab man was sent to shoot him in 
the knee.  He had to return to England for treatment and never returned.  
Some 700 Arabs were put on trial for violence and looting.  Of these, 124 
were accused of murder, 55 were convicted and 25 were sentenced to 
death.  About 160 Jews were also put on trial; 70 were accused of murder 
and 2 were convicted and sentenced to death.  Their sentences were 
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commuted to life imprisonment. 118 
Due to legal technicalities, the most heinous murderers, one Arab and one Jew, did not 
receive the death penalty.  With this in mind, the High Commissioner had to consider 
whether any death sentences were justified.  He knew any decision would be bad from a 
political point of view and decided to commute the majority of the sentences to life in 
prison.  Ultimately, three Arabs were hanged.  
    Reacting to the events, the Jews were inclined to blame the British for their lack 
of preparation, which led to the magnitude of the violence.  The British, meanwhile, 
appointed a commission to investigate the causes of the riots and propose policies to 
prevent their recurrence.  The report from the commission chairman, Sir Walter Shaw, 
identified Jewish immigration and land purchases as direct causes of the unrest.  He 
recommended that 
the British Government should issue a clear statement of policy defining 
the meaning it attached to the passage in the Mandate concerning the 
rights of non-Jewish communities [and that] non-Jewish interests should 
be given some voice in the discussions on immigration. 119   
The High Commissioner, from his perspective, agreed that increasing landlessness was a 
source of Arab resentment.  The Shaw Report called into question immigration policies 
with respect to the absorptive capacity of Palestine and the amount of cultivable land it 
contained.   
The resulting White Paper commended the Jews for consistent land development, 
but noted that the policy of only employing Jews on any land acquired potentially caused 
Arab unemployment.  Further, the land purchases in and around Tel Aviv were virtually 
strangling the Arab community owned pasture and grazing lands outside of Jaffa.  This 
was in violation of the Mandate charter, which ensured that "the rights and positions of 
other sections of the population are not prejudiced."120  The tone of the White Paper 
upset many Jewish leaders but, after discussions with Zionists, Prime Minister 
MacDonald published a letter of his interpretation of the White Paper.  His letter was 
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considerably more pro-Jewish, prompting Arabs to refer to it as the "Black Letter," and 
supporting their belief of the power that Zionists had on the British government.   
After the public split between the London government and the High 
Commissioner, Palestine received new leadership under the control of Sir Arthur 
Wauchope.  A career military man and not a diplomat, he attempted to establish various 
forms of self-government.  He supported proportional representation, but Prime Minister 
MacDonald wanted parity.  By 1932, a disgusted Arab community refused to cooperate 
with the Jews in any area and many resigned their government posts.121  Wauchope tried 
to be sympathetic to Arab issues but he could not disobey the stated government policies, 
especially regarding immigration.       
Jewish immigration continued, undaunted by Arab protests.   The British were not 
in a position to slow the influx because the immigrants of this fifth aliyah brought 
considerable wealth with them.  These settlers, unlike those of earlier waves, “included 
large numbers of stable middle-class families headed by men who had made their mark in 
business and in the professions.”122  The majority of them were escaping the rise of 
Nazism in Germany and Poland.  This was little consolation for the Arabs who felt that 
they were being persecuted in their own land.  The Nazi’s staunch anti-Jewish policies 
“struck at the British in the Middle East… It dispelled for good their hope of muddling 
through in Palestine.  It caused them to double the authorized rate of Jewish immigration 
between 1932 and 1933.”123     
D. INTENSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS 
Since the riots of 1929, political terrorism was becoming more commonplace.  
Arab violence was primarily directed against Jewish farmers, but in July 1932, a British 
official was targeted for the first time.  The Arab national movement was gaining 
momentum and disapproval of the British was growing. 124  The Mufti of Jerusalem 
emerged as the de facto leader of the nationalist movement.  After the riots, the Mufti 
changed his attitude of accommodation to a position where he actively attempted to 
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change British policy while still cooperating with the Mandate government.125  He had 
the precarious job of balancing the expectations of the authorities with the increasingly 
hostile demands of his followers.   
In 1933, the British tripled the immigration quotas out of compassion for the 
plight of the European Jews.  Arab demonstrations were scheduled in cities across 
Palestine for October to protest the immigration policies, which were steadily increasing.  
While the Mufti was out of the country, tempers flared and the demonstrations turned 
into rioting and a general strike.  For the first time, there was widespread violence 
directed at the British administration, as well as Jewish groups, primarily because of the 
despair from the increasing unemployment rates.126  They were tired of British policies 
favoring the Jews.  When the Jews disapproved of British actions, they had contacts to 
leverage and a voice to get the policies reversed or turned in their favor.  The Arabs had 
no such influential backing.  They never enjoyed the “unmediated access to British 
leaders that characterized the Zionist movement.”127  They could only fend for 
themselves with the sole means available to them: violence.     
The Mufti realized he had to choose between loyalty to the British and his militant 
nationalist public.  He fought off a challenge from an emerging, militant political party, 
led by Izz al-Din al-Qassam, but he could not defeat the radical tone that remained.  
When al-Qassam was killed in a skirmish with British police in November 1935, his loss 
was grieved throughout Palestine Arab groups.  He was seen as a martyr that offered the 
Muslims a drastic alternative to the political solutions that had failed thus far.  He 
advocated revolution. 128  
High Commissioner Wauchope knew that the increasing landlessness, 
unemployment, and nationalism of the Arabs, coupled with the threat of strikes made for 
a volatile situation in Palestine.  He believed that a Legislative Council, established to 
give the Arabs a voice in government, would satisfy their grievances.  Arab leaders 
supported the plan, but the Jews rejected it.  The Colonial Office then made several 
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proposals to incorporate Arab demands in a new constitution, specifically addressing 
Jewish immigration and land purchases. When Parliament debated the proposals in 
March and April, Jewish members of both Houses presented the Zionist perspective for 
defeat of the measures.  “The Arab case was never put forward.”129  It was obvious that 
the Jewish political backing had crushed the Arab hopes for influence over Palestinian 
policies.  “It should have been realized in government circles how bitterly the Arabs felt 
when they saw their hopes of securing any self-governing institutions being swept 
away.”130 
E.   THE LAST STRAW 
Just before al-Qassam’s death, a Jewish arms smuggling operation was discovered 
at the Jaffa port.  Further investigation discovered that the Jews were stockpiling weapons 
and ammunition “sufficient to arm an army of ten thousand, according to an official 
British estimate.”131  Arabs acted out in small guerrilla- like terrorist bands, with some 
regional, but no national structure.  “On April 15, 1936, Arab bandits held up some cars 
on the road between Nablus and Tulkarm.  A number of Arab and European travelers 
were robbed, but two Jewish travelers were murdered.  The following night, two Arabs 
living near a Jewish settlement were murdered by Jews, presumably in retaliation.  A 
whole series of mutual reprisals ensued.”132  The violence flared for ten days before the 
Mufti assumed the leadership of the Supreme Arab Committee (now known as the Arab 
Higher Committee), called for a general strike, and assumed the leadership of the 
resistance movement.   
The political violence, British repression, and increasing death and destruction 
forced the Mufti to abandon his arrangement of cooperation with the British. 133  He again 
appealed to the High Commissioner for the prohibition of immigration and land sales to 
Jews, and some form of democratic government.  However, citing Nazi persecution of 
Jews, the British government actually increased immigration slightly above the normal 
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quota.  In an attempt to quell the obvious negative repercussions this action would cause 
in the Arab community, the British announced that a Royal Commission would be 
appointed when order was restored.  Order would take some time to restore.  The general 
strike would last for six months and the revolt would stretch on for some three years.   
When the British finally realized the depths of the rebellion occurring in 
Palestine, and their inability to put it down, they enacted emergency measures and called 
for military reinforcements from England.  After several months of the strike with no real 
progress being made, the rulers of several of the neighboring Arab countries appealed to 
the Arab Higher Committee to call off the strike.  The beginning of the citrus season gave 
the Committee the incentive they needed to call off the strike, and end the restlessness of 
the Muslim people.134   The strike did not accomplish any of the objectives as the Arabs 
had hoped.  While they went back to work, the rebellion continued, spreading from the 
cities to the countryside.   
In many ways, the Arabs disadvantaged themselves with the strike.  Arab workers 
in Jewish businesses were simply replaced with any one of the newly arrived Jewish 
immigrants who needed a job.  Even when Arab strike efforts were successful, as in the 
case of closing the Jaffa port, Jewish groups turned the event to their advantage.  The 
Jewish Agency triumphed by getting the development of a port approved for Tel Aviv.135  
The strike did hurt the Jews in many ways, but it also weakened the Arabs, especially 
their already tenuous relationship with the British.  Because of the rebellion, the Jewish 
Agency and the administration worked closer together than before, united in their effort 
to suppress the uprising.  The Arab community wanted independence more than ever.  
They saw the British and Zionists as an interconnected entity and thought that the 
departure of the British would facilitate the removal of the Jews.136      
Arab anger with the British administration had already erupted into violence on 
several occasions.  Citing the Emergency Regulations, Wauchope authorized the razing 
of nearly 250 houses near the Jaffa port after snipers were found to have hidden in the 
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region.  The legal system was becoming more repressive as well.  Arab civil rights were 
routinely violated, men were jailed for extended periods of time without a trial, and 
collective punishment practices were used frequently, especially on Arab villages.  A 
good number of personnel in the British administration, especially those in the military, 
were sympathetic to the Arab situation but they were discouraged from questioning the 
authority of the government.  The Chief Justice of the court was forced to leave his post 
because he publicly voiced his disagreements with British policy. 137  A young British 
soldier saw the reality of the situation.  “The British had been sent to Palestine to keep the 
peace and punish terrorists, Arabs and Jews.  In practice, the authorities discriminated in 
favor of the Jews, never punishing Jewish terrorists with the severity they used on 
Arabs.”  He knew this was not right and thought that, “the Arabs always seem to get a 
raw deal.”138     
On the same day the Royal Commission was to arrive in Palestine in November 
1936, the British made a concession to the Jews for additional immigration permits.  The 
British had become “obsessed with this policy of balancing its favours between the two 
sides.”139  Initially the Arabs were going to boycott the Commission because they saw 
this as a deliberate act of hostility, but the Arab leaders of Saudi Arabia and Iraq 
convinced the Arab Higher Committee to present the Arab grievances.  The 
Commission’s report, published in July 1937, known as the Peel Report, acknowledged 
that causes of the recent rebellion were the same as the causes of the disorders of 1920, 
1921, 1929 and 1933.140  The Arabs wanted independence.  However, there was no 
possibility of creating a single country that would encompass both the Jewish and Arab 
groups because neither side wanted it.  Peel reached the same conclusion that Wauchope 
had.  The country had to be divided.  The Peel Partition Plan is evident in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  
The Peel Commission Partition Plan. (From Bickerton and Klausner, p. 55.) 
 
The Jews response to the partition plan was primarily favorable, but Arab 
opposition to it was swift.  Although they were allotted more than 80 percent of Palestine 
in the proposal, the most fertile lands were given to the Jews.  Additionally, in the Jewish 
portion, the population was nearly split between numbers of Jews and Arabs.  Yet, in the 
Arab section, Arabs comprised over 90 percent of the population.  This plan would 
require nearly 250,000 Arabs of the Galilee to either be forced to evacuate or agree to 
live under Jewish rule.141  The Arabs were unable to live with a plan that relinquished a 
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part of their country to Jewish sovereignty.  The resulting tensions led to the second, and 
more violent stage of the revolt. 
In September 1937, the first British Mandate official was assassinated.  Lewis 
Andrews was the acting district commissioner for the Galilee, and the official who 
monitored land sale deals between Arabs and Jews.  At the time, Wauchope was 
vacationing out of the country and the acting High Commissioner ruled as he thought 
appropriate.  “The Arab Higher Committee was declared illegal and its leaders, including 
the Mufti, [were] arrested or deported.”142  Arab attacks on Jews continued, but now, the 
Jews retaliated with more skill than the Arabs expected.  The Jews had a better 
organizational structure to their defense forces than the Arabs did.  They had better 
training and more weapons at their disposal.     
For years, the British knew about the Jewish self-defense groups, and implicitly 
supported them by allowing them to exist.  Jabotinsky offered the use of his men to quell 
the Nebi Musa riots in 1920, and later, Jews were trained to augment the dwindling size 
of the British police forces.  Furthermore, the British were aware that the Jews had been 
accumulating weapons for many years.  After the 1921 Nebi Musa riots, Weizmann told 
Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, that rifles were being smuggled into 
Palestine.  Churchill responded: “We don’t mind, but don’t speak of it.”143  Later, when 
the Arab attacks turned against the British in the great revolt, the British worked closely 
with the Jewish defense organization, Haganah, to combat the Arab threat.  “Arab 
terrorism helped the Jewish Agency make the point that the Zionists movement and the 
British movement were standing shoulder to shoulder against a common enemy, in a war 
in which they had common goals.  The British administration was now inclined to realize 
this.”144  The British and Jews had a reciprocal arrangement to provide each other 
intelligence about rebel Arab identities and plans.145  Arab violence early in the conflict 
and the violence directed at the British, decreased the British support for their cause and 
resulted in a lack of resources made available to the Arabs.    The Jews used their training 
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effectively, and with the leaders of the Arab cause politically alienated from participation 
in any negotiations, the violence continued.            
In late 1938, the rebellion continued, albeit somewhat diminished in intensity.  
High Commissioner Wauchope, a broken man as a result of his failure to stop the 
violence, retired.  Sir Harold MacMichael relieved him and immediately established 
military courts, in addition to the martial law, which was still in force.146  Arab suspects 
were tried for their suspected offenses swiftly and over 9,000 served some prison time in 
1939 alone.  “From the beginning of 1938 to the end of 1939 more than one hundred 
Arabs were sentenced to death – an average of one a week – and more than thirty were 
executed, or more than one a month.”147  Additionally, the collective punishment practice 
was in full effect.  Entire neighborhoods or villages were held responsible for crimes 
suspected to be committed by one member of the community.  The thought process 
amongst British law enforcement was that everyone was potentially guilty until proven 
otherwise.   The hope was that by putting the responsibility for damages on the entire 
community, the leaders of the community would assume the responsibility for keeping 
peace in the community. 148 
Given the lack of popular support, the partition plan suggested in The Peel Report 
“sunk into oblivion,” just as the population transfer plan had before it, when the British 
determined that it would be too difficult to implement.  Both the Arabs and the Jews were 
intent on realizing their goals completely; neither side had any intention of 
compromising. 149  The British, however, were becoming less interested in the 
disturbances of Palestine, as war in Europe became an increasingly real possibility.  
Britain knew that to increase their strategic holdings in the Middle East, they would have 
to adopt a position that would not continue to alienate the Arabs, and drive them to the 
Nazis as their potential liberators.150  As the war loomed, the Jewish power of influence 
weakened and they were unable to stop the Nazis as they destroyed the German Jewish 
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center.  The British finally recognized that allowing as many German Jewish refugees as 
they did to immigrate had contributed to the Arab rebellion. 
F. EXIT STRATEGY 
The British weighed their options in Palestine and concluded that “the Jews had 
no alternative other than to support Britain; the Arabs in contrast, would chose to support 
the Germans.”  This was not an acceptable outcome.  “Thus, to secure the Arabs’ 
allegiance [Colonial Secretary Malcolm] MacDonald proposed halting all Jewish 
immigration for the entire period of the war.”151  The British made one last attempt to 
facilitate an understanding between the Arabs and the Jews.  They called for a Round 
Table Conference to commence in London in February 1939.  However, even as they 
were supposedly reaching out an olive branch for one final attempt at peace, the British 
refused to allow those they regarded as responsible for the violence in Palestine to attend 
the Conference.  Under these qualifications, the Mufti was not permitted to attend the 
talks.152  As nearly all the influential Arab leaders were in exile, there were few 
representatives available to confer with for the Arab perspective.  Those that did attend 
the conference were not able to present one united Arab position and exemplified the 
fragmentation that was a persistent disadvantage for the Arab cause.         
In May 1939, the British issued a White Paper on their intentions for the future of 
Palestine.  It is perhaps the most controversial paper issued on the subject, an even more 
stunning reversal of policy than the 1930 Passfield White Paper, since that declaration 
was quickly superceded by the Prime Minister’s “Black Letter.”  The White Paper stated, 
“His Majesty’s Government had never contemplated the subordination of the Arabic 
population, language or culture in Palestine.” 153  Furthermore, it called for severe 
restrictions on immigration for the next five years, and future immigration only with Arab 
approval, and implied the guarantee of an independent Arab government in Palestine 
within ten years.     
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Arabs were disappointed with the declaration because they felt that the language 
was too vague to believe that the creation of an Arab state would actually occur.  The 
Jewish reaction was stronger.  They were completely opposed to the proposed reduction 
in immigration and saw their hopes for independence evaporating. 154  After three years of 
open rebellion, the British were still deluded in their hope for a compromise. 
The Permanent Mandates Commission ruled that the new White Paper did not 
comply with the terms of the Mandate, but the outbreak of the Second World War in 
September 1939 prevented any further determination or action on those judgments.155  
The White Paper served one major purpose for the British.  It helped ensure enough 
compliance from the Arabs to allow Britain to get through the war years without having 
to divert additional troops to Palestine.  The Zionists wanted to oppose the restrictions on 
Jewish immigration publicly but decided instead to use the opportunity to quietly position 
themselves to achieve a Jewish state.   
The threat to Jewish survival from a German invasion of the Middle East 
prompted the Jews to offer the British assistance, despite their opposition to the White 
Paper.  Britain decided to accept the Jewish aid and did not impound arms from Haganah.  
The British Army provided money, arms and training for an elite group of Haganah 
volunteers (who would later become the nucleus of the Israeli Army).156  The Jews 
eagerly accepted training in bomb making, explosive use and sabotage work for use 
behind German lines.  Haganah agents at the disposal of the British secret service 
prepared for intelligence collecting in Syria, while others volunteered to parachute into 
the Balkans to bolster the resistance.  However, when the threat of a German invasion 
had passed, and news of the mass murders taking place in Nazi war camps spread, the 
Jewish community turned their aggressions toward the British and blamed them for 
failing “somehow to organize a rescue.”157   The Jewish attitude changed thereafter.  Acts 
of resistance toward the government increased, including the promotion of illegal 
immigration, gunrunning, theft and murder.    
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G. CONCLUSIONS 
As the war drew to a close, Britain was nearly bankrupt.  The British had neither 
the capacity nor the interest to maintain their rule in Palestine.  The Arab rebellion made 
the British realize the impossibility of ever resolving the issue of compromise between 
the Arabs and the Jews.  They considered taking steps to get out then, but the war delayed 
their decision.  They had been fighting against the Arabs for the better part of a decade, 
and now the Jews were attacking them as well.  The Mandatory government had to focus 
most of its efforts on security and protecting its personnel, rather than on the maintenance 
of the regime.158  The British did not want to stay in Palestine anymore.  Their fateful 
decision to seek deportation for illegal immigrants, many of whom were Holocaust 
survivors, lost Britain international support, especially in the United States.  The furor 
over their treatment of these people and the ensuing public criticisms prompted the 
decision to turn the Palestinian Mandate over to the United Nations for resolution.   
Britain’s abrupt announcement of plans to leave Palestine caught the Arabs and 
the Jews, off guard.  The Arabs were more politically fragmented than ever.  The rivalries 
between the Husaynis and the Nashshashibis had never been mended and the few leaders 
that had emerged in the Arab national movement were either killed or exiled, which 
further reduced their effectiveness.  The friendly and positive relationship the British had 
with the Zionist leaders for most of their two decades of rule had all but disappeared 
since the war began.  They were battling the Jews now, almost more than they were 
fighting the Arabs.  The Jews were ready to be free of the British, the Arabs, however 
were not sure they were prepared for independence. 
The Jewish community in Palestine had taken full advantage of the opportunities 
presented to them by the British.  They eagerly accepted British protection under the 
Mandate when they were weak structurally, and used their powers of influence to 
pressure Britain to continue, and even increase, their policies benefiting the Jews over the 
course of the Mandate.  “It was British policy […] that was primarily responsible for 
providing the Yishuv time to grow, through immigration and land purchases, and time to 
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establish quasi-governmental and military institutions.”159  The Arabs, conversely, were 
never able to take advantage of the British presence in Palestine.   
The predominantly tribal and agrarian structure of the Arab society in Palestine 
often led to internal divisions.  This fragmentation caused critical disadvantages for the 
Arab position at times during the Mandate when they needed to speak in one voice.  They 
were not willing to make any compromises with the Zionists and turned to violence to 
express their displeasure with British policies, only further alienating them from the 
positions of authority in the administration.  Taking the position of aggressor in their 
conflict with the Zionists actually left the Arabs weaker because their use of violence 
undermined their influence with the administration.  The Arabs never possessed the 
political power the Zionists did.  They were no match for the Zionists, who originally had 
the British behind them, and later were strong enough in their own right to challenge the 
Arabs for predominance in Palestine.   
By the time the Zionists and Palestinian Arabs fought their war for independence, 
the Jewish leaders had used the fragmented nature of Arab political leaders to their 
advantage.  They brokered deals with specific Arab leaders, capitalizing on the 
aspirations of a few Arab leaders at the expense of the entire Palestinian Arab 
community.  The collusion with the Hashimite rule of TransJordan was one such 
arrangement.  The Palestinian Arabs’ “power to influence the destiny of Palestine was 
secondary to that of the other three parties with strategic and territorial interests in 
Palestine; the British, the Zionists and the Hashimites.”160  With so many outside 
influences competing for control of the region, the Palestinian Arabs barely had any 
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V. COLLUSION FOR THE DISPOSITION OF ARAB 
PALESTINIAN LANDS  
 
This chapter reveals the collusion that occurred between both the British and 
Jewish leaders, and Abdullah, the ruler of TransJordan.  It explains the politically 
fragmented, tribal structure of the Arabs, and Abdullah’s interest in furthering his own 
power base and land holdings, regardless of the effect this action would have on the 
greater Arab cause.  This is important because it shows that rather than seek a 
compromise solution amongst the Arabs that were his historic tribal rivals, Abdullah 
preferred to negotiate with the Zionists.  Furthermore, his obligation to the British for his 
position and security was so strong that he could not act against their wishes vis-à-vis the 
Zionists even if he had wanted to.    
A. LITTLE MAN WITH BIG AMBITIONS 
Abdullah, as Emir of TransJordan, ruled the most artificial of the artificial nations 
created by the British in the Middle East.  The land he controlled had no natural borders 
and lacked any kind of an established sedentary population, let alone the ability to 
maintain itself financially.  The substantial subsidy upon which his budget was dependant 
and the presence of British advisors, constantly reminded him that British views were 
expected to be his views, at least publicly.  Abdullah was happy to maintain an alliance 
with the British, but he made no secret about his desire to expand the land he controlled 
to include more of the land historically encompassed in “Greater Syria.”  However, 
because the British had an agreement with the French, and because of his obligation to 
the British, he did not actively pursue physical steps to obtain that desire.  Initially, he 
was forced to accept the small portion of land he was granted and owed thanks to the 
British for the ability to maintain that much.  When the British needed an ally in the 
Middle East to champion the Jewish state that was likely going to emerge in Palestine, 
they looked to him.   Abdullah, even to the consternation of other Arab states, gave a 
measure of support to the plan out of his obligation to advocate the British position.  He 
also saw the potential opportunity to finally achieve the realization of his dream: to 
enlarge the area of land he controlled. 
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Abdullah, the second of Sharif Husayn’s four sons, was known as a well-educated 
and politically ambitious schemer.161  He was the son that most enthusiastically strove to 
accomplish Husayn’s interests and believed, like his father, that the Hashimite family was 
destined to rule the Arab world.  Accordingly, Husayn chose the astute Abdullah to travel 
to Cairo when he made his initial proposal to the British to oust the Ottomans from the 
Arabian Peninsula.162  It was Abdullah’s conception and planning of the Arab Revolt that 
inspired Husayn’s grandiose ambitions to gain supremacy of the entire Arab Middle 
East.163  Conversely, the physically picturesque Faisal gained the greatest respect from 
the British.  He built a reputation as a noble warrior in battle, which coincided with the 
stereotypical picture they had formed of Arabs; Abdullah was better suited as a political 
advisor.   
When the French arrived in Damascus to claim their mandatory authority, Faisal 
was banished from his position in Syria.  Abdullah, still smarting from his defeat to Ibn 
Saud’s Wahabi forces at Turaba, needed a military victory to improve his image.  He 
recognized the importance of fighting to reclaim the crown of Syria for his brother as a 
virtuous opportunity to reassert himself as a force to be reckoned with, thus earning the 
redemption of British graces.  Ambitiously, Abdullah moved a small force of troops to 
Amman, where he intended to raise a larger force and prepared to invade Syria on 
Faisal’s behalf.  His actions, however, threatened to disrupt the British plans in the 
Middle East and upset their already “suspicious” French allies.164   
The British, as a kind of compensation for the loss of Syria, offered Faisal the 
crown of Iraq, thus rendering Abdullah’s desires for that post obsolete.  Abdullah was 
jealous and bitter that his brother was succeeding in the British eyes where he had not.  
He felt especially scorned because he had intervened on the British behalf to his father 
whenever possible.165  The British then assessed the situation and concluded that 
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Abdullah’s arrival in Amman could actually be used to their benefit.  They determined 
that TransJordan was included in the British zone of influence according to Sykes-Picot, 
rather than attached to the Damascus controlled district.  Additionally, control of the 
region would offer a continuous land link between western Palestine and Iraq.  The 
British surmised that, by appointing Abdullah as the representative of the British 
government in TransJordan, the Arab hostilities against the French could be obverted.  
Furthermore, the French would be contained in Syria, halting their ability to extend their 
influence south toward the Suez Canal.   
Appointing Abdullah to the position of emir served several purposes.  First, 
Abdullah would have to renounce his claim to the throne in Iraq, which pleased the 
British officials in Baghdad who supported Faisal’s appointment.  Second, Churchill 
viewed the selection of Abdullah as a positive move for his “Sharifian” policy to secure 
the goodwill of Husayn, with whom relations had deteriorated.  Finally, it was readily 
acknowledged that Abdullah was more ambitious than his brothers, causing concern that 
he would not be content as a mere figurehead.  However, the British were confident that 
they could count on his loyalty because he “relied on His Majesty’s Government for the 
retention of his office.”166  Abdullah relished in his good fortune of having avoided a 
battle with the French and gaining an appointment to an administration of his own.  
While he knew he owed this accomplishment solely to the British power, he longed for 
more.      
B. WALKING SOFTLY 
Since his initial appointment, Abdullah had to consciously check his ambitious 
views with the British policy that he was expected to conform to.  He maintained that 
TransJordan was essentially the southern part of Syria and that a united Arab state could 
still result in the region of Greater Syria (TransJordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria).  He 
saw his current position as merely a precursor to the achievement of his goal in its 
entirety.  With the defeat of the Hashimites to Ibn Saud in the Hijaz and the death of his 
brother Faisal in 1933, Abdullah saw himself as the natural remaining choice to rule the 
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Arabs.  He worked tirelessly to champion the cause of Arab national politics, but he knew 
that his ambitions must be tempered with patience and self-discipline.   
Over time, Abdullah’s claims for Arab unity, united under his leadership, came to 
antagonize the other Arab states.  The Iraqis thought that they were the best candidates to 
lead a united Arab world, while the Lebanese did not want to be part of a Muslim state 
and the Syrians were quite content with their newly achieved independence.  Finally, the 
Saudis and the Egyptians, by extension, would hinder any plan where a Hashimite would 
achieve an additional position of power.167  Abdullah was persistent, though, and he was 
open-minded to the multiple options available to achieve his intention to rule additional 
land in Greater Syria.  Gaining control over Palestine became known as another possible 
means by which he could achieve his larger objective.     
Abdullah recognized that he could not gain any additional power in the region 
without Britain’s approval, and if he tried to take it forcibly, he would not maintain the 
power he had for very long.  In fact, when he met Churchill to accept the administration 
of TransJordan, he asked to be given control over Palestine as well.  Churchill declined 
his suggestion, but Abdullah remained hopeful that he could convince the British of his 
suitability for the post based on the political and economic ties historically linking 
Palestine and TransJordan.  He believed that if he used his diplomatic skills to maintain 
good relations with the British, Palestinian Arabs, and the Jews that the British might 
reconsider their stand on the subject of Palestine. 
C. CARRYING A BIG STICK 
Churchill, as he liked to brag, created the emirate of TransJordan by the stroke of 
a pen on a Sunday afternoon.168  It was a land determined completely for British interests 
and by British design, and they made a point of making sure Abdullah was well aware of 
this fact.  The control and influence over TransJordan they maintained was indirect, but 
firm, nonetheless.  Abdullah was granted power over internal state affairs, but was kept in 
check by the British Resident in Amman for all foreign relations matters.169  The 
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constitutional government gave Abdullah the appearance as a ruler of an area with its 
own power base, when in actuality, he was a subordinate of the British.  Abdullah was 
aware of his role in relation to the British but remained loyal to them because he felt that 
his Arab interests could be best achieved through cooperation with the British. 170  The 
British, he acknowledged, supported TransJordan politically, economically and militarily.  
Abdullah saw participation in a symbiotic relationship with the British as the most 
productive way to gain cooperation for, or at least avoid a challenge of his aims.   
In an attempt to foster relations with any group that he could, and to gain 
patronage for his expansionist goals, he maintained close contact with many of the Syrian 
nationalists that had been in Faisal’s administration in Damascus.  Abdullah employed 
many Palestinians in high-ranking positions in his government.  The Palestinian 
administrators brought him much needed technical aid and served to improve his image 
with the Palestinian people.  Among the most influential families in Palestine to back 
Abdullah, the Nashshashibis urged for reunification with TransJordan.  The Husayni 
family, led by the Mufti of Jerusalem, Haj Amin, formed the core of the movement in 
opposition to reunification and objected to any compromise with the Zionists.171  The 
Husayni-backed Palestinian nationalist movement would be directed, in time, against the 
British as well, and would cause a power struggle for the control of Palestine. 
D. FRIEND OR FOE? 
Despite, or perhaps partly because of the hostility that Haj Amin had for the 
Jewish immigrants, Abdullah took a more amicable stance in his relations with the 
Zionists.  He was perceptive enough to realize the consequences of not supporting the 
British.  Abdullah’s father, Sharif Husayn had bitterly refused to recognize the Mandate 
government, and the Balfour Declaration at its core, because of what he regarded as the 
British betrayal of the promises made to him in the Husayn-McMahon 
correspondence.172  Although, it is interesting to note that his refusal to accept the 
Balfour Declaration was not based on significant anti-Semitic feelings.   Regardless, as a 
result of his actions, the British discontinued their financial subsidy and military 
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protection of Husayn.  Within a year Ibn Saud’s forces had conquered the entire Hijaz 
and forced Husayn into exile, ending the dream of a Hashimite empire spanning from the 
Hijaz through Greater Syria.  Therefore, Abdullah, concerned about maintaining British 
approval and consequently his own office, recognized the Mandate and the Balfour 
Declaration.   
Palestine represented to Abdullah more than just a British station to favor.  For 
him, it was a vital source of capital markets and an outlet to the Mediterranean.  He 
wanted to control the land, but in the interim until he had the British approval to do so, he 
set out to win over the population.  Abdullah believed that he could incorporate the 
Jewish communities of Palestine as semi-autonomous regions within his sovereignty as a 
part of Greater Syria.173  He thought the Jewish groups could occupy places in his 
Muslim kingdom the way Christian groups had in the Ottoman Empire.  It was under this 
pretext that he made his request to Churchill to administer Palestine as well as 
TransJordan, and for this reason that he initially approached the Zionists.   
Positive public opinion, especially British opinion, was an integral aspect of 
Abdullah’s strategy for acceptance of his expansionist goals.  He knew that the only way 
he would be granted all of Palestine would be through Jewish acceptance, or at least 
acquiescence, to his rule.  Abdullah valued the power of the Jewish people because of 
their wealth, talent, drive and the alleged vast connections they had with influential 
members of the international community.174  His respect for the Jews was based on the 
teachings of the Koran and was actually a Hashimite tradition that his father and brother 
Faisal recognized as well.  In fact, Faisal was the first Hashimite to meet with a Zionist 
leader openly.  His introduction to Chaim Weizmann was arranged by the British to 
discuss the possibility of cooperation and emphasized the alliance that both sides had 
with Britain. 
In Abdullah’s own meeting with Weizmann in 1922, he offered to support Zionist 
demands to implement the Balfour Declaration in exchange for their support of him as 
emir of Palestine.  Further, he required the use of Zionist influence on the British to 
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“procure this appointment for him.”175  While it is not likely that the Zionists ever 
considered an option for anything less than an independent Jewish state, they did view 
their relationship with the Hashimites as a potential deterrent to any opponents they 
might encounter in the region.  Both Abdullah and the Zionists were flexible to find ways 
of cooperating, but each side hoped that their idyllic suggestion would be realized.   
E. LOVE THY NEIGHBOR 
In several meetings throughout the 1920s, Frederick Kisch, chairman of the 
Palestine Zionist Executive, traveled to Amman to speak with Abdullah and his father 
about relations between Jews and Arabs.  Abdullah replied that he would always do what 
he could to maintain friendly relations between the two groups.  He wanted to gain what 
he could of Jewish financial and technical resources to advance the development of 
TransJordan; the Zionists wanted to establish goodwill.   
The meetings continued between Abdullah and the Zionists into the 1930s, 
including one in which Abdullah offered to lease some of his own land to Jewish 
capitalists willing to develop it.  However, word of the deal caused outrage in the 
Palestinian press.  British official reaction was not supportive of the agreement, either, 
because of unspoken fear that Arab-Zionist collaboration would reduce British control 
over the actors in the region.  Consequently, Abdullah publicly renounced the agreement, 
but secretly he renewed the Jewish option on the land.176  Despite British and Palestinian 
opposition to the pact, Abdullah was willing to explore any avenue that would result in 
greater economic stability for TransJordan.   
The British were not about to let the issue die without a fight so they passed the 
Nationality Law to prevent leasing of land to non-citizens. 177  Abdullah’s efforts for 
cooperation could not be deterred though, and he looked for other ways to remain 
actively involved with Palestinian issues.  Meetings between Abdullah and high-ranking 
Zionists occurred more frequently and took on a more political nature after the British 
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thwarted plans for economic cooperation.   The British desire to keep Abdullah and the 
Zionists had backfired. 
Abdullah used his meetings with the Zionists as an audience to whom he could 
promote his plan to unite Palestine under his rule.  He hoped to convince the Jews of his 
benevolence and get them to influence the British to accept him as the ruler of Palestine.  
However, Abdullah’s effort to secure rule of Palestine for himself was much to the 
consternation of Haj Amin al-Husayni, who led the nationalist movement in Palestine.  
Haj Amin denounced Abdullah as a puppet of British imperialism and shifted his loyalty 
to Ibn Saud, the enemy of the Hashimites.178  Abdullah’s relationship with the Zionists 
caused some concern among nationalist Arabs, but overall, he maintained his reputation. 
The general strike in Palestine, declared by the Arab Higher Committee in 1936, 
threatened to spread to other Arab states in the region.  The Arabs were angered to the 
boiling point about unchecked immigration and land sales to Jews.  Abdullah, whose 
predictions about impending violence were sadly realized, was approached by the British 
to use his influence to end the strike.  He tried to persuade the Arab leaders that 
negotiations and airing grievances to the commission of inquiry were the best solutions to 
resolve the conflict.  Abdullah had to balance his rhetoric cautiously to “preserve his 
credibility simultaneously as a loyal ally of Britain, a sincere friend of the Jews and an 
Arab patriot defending the rights of his Palestinian brothers.”179         
After the Peel Commission report recommended the partition of Palestine, and 
later when World War II eroded French authority in Syria and Lebanon, Abdullah 
thought his plans for a Greater Syria appeared more within the realm of possibility. 180  
The British quietly supported Abdullah to rule the Arab portion of Palestine, only 
because the Mufti vehemently opposed partition of any kind.181  Although, the British 
made it clear that they would not endorse Abdullah’s entire ambitious scheme because 
they did not want to antagonize the Egyptians or Saudi Arabians.  Ibn Saud had vowed 
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revenge if any Hashimite ever attempted to amass a power base in Greater Syria, and the 
British were not willing to risk antagonizing him by showing support for Abdullah.    
The Zionist policy of privately accepting, but publicly criticizing the partition 
plan had been self-defeating and the plan failed ratification in the British parliament.182  
With hostilities running high in Palestine, the Jews were looking to establish an 
understanding with the Arabs.  Since there was, obviously, no possibility of reaching an 
accord with the Palestinian Arabs, they approached Abdullah, whose previous initiations 
to form a friendship had not been forgotten.  Abdullah gave new life to the plan for 
partition in his proposal to the Woodhead Commission and took a new round of 
criticisms from Palestinian Arabs.  The Jews, conversely, were interested in discussing 
his plan in greater depth and replied with a counter-proposal.   
In a final move to curtail Arab violence in Palestine, Britain issued the 1939 
White Paper.  The document conceded many of the Arab demands.  It reduced 
immigration allowance, halted land sales to Jews and offered the Arabs an independent 
state after ten years.  This was the greatest reversal of policy supporting the Balfour 
Declaration in two decades.183  Unfortunately, the outbreak of World War II put 
implementation of any plan on hold.  During the war years, the Middle East engaged in 
what amounted to a temporary truce, but it would not last long after the war ended. 
F. WAR IN EUROPE BUT COOPERATION CLOSE TO HOME 
While Britain was busy fighting the war in Europe, Abdullah was attempting to 
further his own hold in Palestine.  His vocal support of Britain’s war effort helped ease 
him back into the good graces of the Arab world, and the exile of the Mufti before the 
war left a power vacuum amongst the Palestinian Arabs that he tried to fill.  Throughout 
the course of the war, Abdullah met with Jewish leaders to discuss their opinions of his 
views for the future of Palestine.  He met with Moshe Sharrett and Elias Sasson in 
November 1942 and again in January 1944 to delineate the federation status he 
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envisioned for Palestine, and agreed to negotiate the question of Jewish immigration in 
exchange for financial assistance.184   
The end of the war in Europe brought Abdullah great rewards for his loyalty to 
the British.  TransJordan was given formal independence and Abdullah was elevated to 
the crown of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan. 185  Speculation persists that the 
enthronement was an attempt to appease Abdullah after the British informed him that 
they would not support his Greater Syria plan due to the problems it could cause in the 
Arab League.  With this notification, Abdullah turned the focus his priorities on gaining 
control of Palestine.   
Abdullah sent his deputy Prime Minister, Muhammad al-Unsi, to conduct several 
ground- laying meetings with the Jewish Agency representative, Elias Sasson.  After 
Unsi’s death in 1946, Sasson began meeting with Abdullah personally.186  The two men 
agreed to a plan where the Zionists would give Abdullah nearly £P40, 000 to effect the 
results of the elections in Syria and the Arab Higher Committee, bringing pro-Zionist 
candidates to power.  Additional meetings continued to take place, both with Abdullah 
directly, and through intermediaries.  In each instance, pledges of support were reasserted 
and monetary assistance was presented to Abdullah.  Abdullah and the Zionists did not 
always agree with each other in every detail, but they did have compatible big picture 
goals.  “Abdullah agreed to support a Jewish state in Palestine if the Jews would support 
the Greater Syria idea.”187     
G. THE END OF THE MANDATE 
The British power base in the Middle East had been in decline since the end of the 
war.  It had become more than apparent that the political aspirations of the Jews and  
Arabs in Palestine were irreconcilable, and the British feared that the issue would have to 
be concluded by force.   They wavered in their commitment to a Jewish homeland when 
they came to realize their dependence on Arab controlled oil.   Finally, the bombings, 
killings and kidnappings of mandatory administrators by disgruntled right-wing Jewish 
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political groups caused the British to submit the issue to the United Nations for 
resolution.  They announced that if an agreement could not be reached between Jews and 
Arabs, they would withdraw from the Mandate.   
Abdullah met with the UN committee privately to express his proposed solution.  
He stated that he would like to control all of Palestine, giving citizenship rights to the 
Jews that were there.  Later, he claimed that he would be willing to assume control of any 
region in Palestine that was not granted as an independent Jewish state.  The public 
announcements by Abdullah were most often made to dispel rumors and quiet any 
suspicions from other Arab groups that felt his actions were pro-Zionist and to the 
detriment of the Palestinian Arabs.  Unfortunately, Abdullah’s public recants of pledges 
to support the Jews left them confused as to his genuine intentions.   
  As the British were preparing to abandon the Mandate, they concluded that “a 
greater TransJordan would not be against Britain’s interest, so […there was] no reason 
why they should put obstacles in TransJordan’s way.”188  Abdullah, for his part, set out 
to facilitate an arrangement with the Jews to divide Palestine between them, thereby 
enlarging his kingdom at the expense of the Mufti.  The Zionist interest in this proposal 
was to avoid having to face the Arab Legion in battle.  Formed, trained and led by British 
military officers, Jordan’s Arab Legion could present the greatest threat to any adversary.   
To fully ascertain Abdullah’s stand on matters of Jewish independence, Golda 
Meir was sent to represent the Political Department of the Jewish Agency in a meeting 
with the king.  Abdullah repeated his  preference to have a Jewish republic, as an entity 
within the Jordanian monarchy.  Furthermore, he wanted to hear the results of the UN 
resolution before he would discuss how he would react to a Jewish state.  However, he 
did express his understanding for Jewish desire of that result, and concluded the meeting 
with plans to confer again after the UN decision had been published.  The Jewish 
leadership was pleased with the result of the meeting, which amounted to a non-
aggression pact with the only Arab state in possession of an army capable of doing 
serious harm to the Jews.189    
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Before any action was taken in Palestine, Abdullah wanted to ensure he had some 
kind of endorsement from the British.  He instructed the British Minister to Jordan, Alec 
Kirkbride, to pressure his government for a reaction to the Jordanian proposal to avoid 
taking part in a conflict in Palestine.  By the beginning of 1948, the British acknowledged 
that the best solution for them would be to allow Jordan to annex Arab Palestine.190  In 
this solution, Abdullah would achieve his goal to expand his land holdings and gain the 
strategic bonus of obtaining access to the Mediterranean. The British, meanwhile, would 
maintain their influence over the region through the financial subsidies they paid to 
Jordan. 
Britain had, once again, used “artfully contrived” ambiguity to convey their 
encouragement of the Hashimite proposal. 191  In short, the British wanted to strengthen 
their relationship with the Arab states, assured Abdullah that they would continue to have 
troops stationed in Jordan, and promised to continue supplying the Arab Legion with 
equipment and training.  However, they clearly admonished the king not to permit the 
Arab Legion into the areas allotted for the Jewish state.192  A delicate balance would 
have to be achieved between the UN provisions for the Jewish state and the wishes of the 
other Arab states.  Similar to the position Abdullah took, Britain publicly opposed 
partition, while it secretly encouraged it.  Consequently, “Britain now became a party to 
an attempt to frustrate the UN partition plan and divide up Palestine instead between 
Abdullah and the Jews.”193   
Despite the fact that Abdullah and Golda Meir did not meet again personally, as 
planned, messages were transmitted between them.  Meir was concerned that Abdullah 
would uphold his promise, and he attempted to assure her that he was a man of honor.  
The Jewish leaders were skeptical, though, and not understanding of the role of honor in 
Arab politics, continued to fear that Abdullah would betray them.  In an additional 
misunderstanding, the Jews erroneously believed that the British had set aside Abdullah’s 
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proposal and were focusing on a solution relying on Syria.194  In fact, the British and 
Jews had few, if any ties left at this point.  “No tripartite collusion was possible and the 
triangle had only two arms, one linking Abdullah to Britain and the other to the Jewish 
Agency.”195  Abdullah was the essential factor in the collusion.  He was the glue between 
the Jews and the British that held the deal together. 
The Syrian Arab Liberation Army joined Abdullah’s Arab Legion in the anti-
Husayni program.  Fawzi al-Qawukji, the Syrian leader, believed that a solution could 
have been found for the problems in Palestine, had it not been for the Mufti and his 
ambition.  He, too, was willing to join Abdullah’s secret agreement with the Jews.  
During a pivotal battle at Kastel, the Mufti’s cousin, his most able and charismatic 
military commander, was killed because Qawukji denied him a large supply of arms to 
defend against the Jewish offensive.  The death of this commander caused the collapse of 
Haj Amin’s forces in Palestine and turned the tide in the Jewish favor.196 
The Jewish victories in battle, coupled with their fear of Abdullah retreating from 
his promises, caused them to consider expanding to areas greater than the UN partition 
had originally intended.  The Arab Legion, Abdullah proclaimed, had no choice but to 
take steps to protect the Arab Palestinians from the Jewish attacks, especially after the 
raid on the village of Deir Yassin.  Public statements made by Abdullah to increase his 
credibility as an Arab nationalist further fueled the Jewish fears.  Abdullah was caught in 
a dilemma.  He wanted to maintain goodwill with the Jews and benefit from their 
materiel support, but to do so publicly would cause him to be denounced as a traitor to 
the Arab world.  Therefore, he could not divulge his actual intentions, even to many high-
ranking members of his own administration. 197  
As the situation in Palestine deteriorated into war, the Jewish forces stepped up 
raids against Arabs.  In the end, the Arab Legion only attacked the area allotted to the 
Jews once, and British officers on the scene claimed that it was a misunderstanding. 198  
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Abdullah did what he could to avoid conflict between the Jewish forces and his Arab 
Legion in all the confusion of the end of the administration.  However, when the Mandate 
ended without a truce accepted by either side, the conflict continued for several more 
months.  When the Haganah made preemptive strikes against the Arabs, Abdullah was 
compelled to take an active role in the fighting out of solidarity to his Arab brethren.  
Nevertheless, he always remained true to his pledge to avoid bloodshed with the Jews, if 
at all possible. 
H. CONCLUSIONS 
Despite confusion, mistrust and intrigue on the part of every player involved in the 
conflict, the 1948 Arab-Israeli war eventually ended with a cease-fire.  Ironically, the 
result after months of fighting by combined Arab forces was that the Jews controlled 
more land than was originally allotted to them in any of the partition plans.  Figure 4 
illustrates the disposition of Palestinian land following the war of Israeli independence.  
Jordan annexed the majority of the remaining portion of Palestine, in the land now 
referred to as the West Bank.  Abdullah’s dream to expand his land holdings had finally 
been realized, but at what cost? 
Ever since the days before the First World War when Sharif Husayn longed for 
greater autonomy under Ottoman rule, his son Abdullah envisioned a Hashimite empire 
stretching across the Arab world.  Abdullah planned to represent the family in Iraq, but 
relinquished that claim in favor of his brother and settled for the emirate of TransJordan.  
While happy to have received the appointment, Abdullah always longed for more, and he 
made no secret of that desire.  His plans to expand north and rejoin the regions of Greater 
Syria were disapproved of by the British because of the impact such a move might have 
on relations with their French ally.  Abdullah capitulated to the British wishes because of 




Figure 4.  
Israeli Territory 1949: Area of Jewish State as Proposed by the UN and Additional Area 
Conquered by Israel (From Bickerton and Klausner, p. 92.) 
 
Abdullah never entirely gave up hope on the Greater Syria plan, but he shifted his 
focus to attaining Palestine once the partition plans were suggested.  The Zionists had the 
ear of the British, as he was well aware.  Therefore, Abdullah concluded that positive 
relations with them could only strengthen his efforts to gain control of the land and could 
influence the British to approve of his intention.  He knew that acting without the 
approval of the British could have dire consequences for his survival in the position that 
he held.  He did not want to do anything that could cause the British to withdraw their 
monetary aid or military support.   
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Abdullah faced opposition to his dealings with the Zionists from several of the 
neighboring Arab states.  Ibn Saud and the Egyptians did not want to see the Hashimite 
enlarge his sphere of control.  The Mufti of Jerusalem, speaking for the Palestinian 
Arabs, as well as, the Syrians also disapproved because of their belief that Palestine 
should become an independent Arab state, not one ruled by Abdullah.  Therefore, 
Abdullah tried to keep any meetings he had with the Zionist leaders strictly confidential.  
He did not want to anger or disappoint his Arab brothers, but he could not resist the 
opportunity to take the necessary actions to realize his own goals.  The mere rumors 
about his meetings were enough to spawn accusations by Arab leaders that he was a 
traitor to their cause.  At its base, the claim may have been true.  Abdullah was willing to 
betray the Palestinian Arab cause for independence in order to achieve what he felt was 
his destiny, rule over as much of Greater Syria as possible.   
Because of his dependence on the British patronage, Abdullah had to placate them 
when they required him to avoid a confrontation with the French administration in Syria.  
Abdullah relented with respect to Syria, but only because he saw a new avenue for 
expansion opening in Palestine and he thought he could pursue Syria at a later date.  
When the British announced that they would be abandoning the Mandate in Palestine, 
Abdullah saw his opportunity.  Additionally, he was given a measure of British support 
of his plan as long as he did not encroach on the land that was designated for the Jews.   
With this approval, Abdullah engaged in discussions with the Jews for the 
partition of Palestine between their two groups.  Ultimately, Abdullah paid the highest 
price for his grandiose ambitions.  He was assassinated just two years after the cease-fire 
was reached for the Arab-Israeli war.  Arab nationalists could never accept that he had 
likely conspired with the Jewish enemy for the advancement of his own aims.  Given 
what was known about Abdullah from those that knew him and from his own 








This thesis has analyzed the British Mandate in Palestine.  It examined the factors 
that afforded the Jews, a minority group in Palestine, the ability to amass enough political 
power, both internally and in the international community, to successfully declare Israel 
as an independent country following the end of the British Mandate.  The lobbying of the 
World Zionist Organization, and Chaim Weizmann in particular, kept pressure on the 
British political leaders in London to ensure that Palestine was developed as a national 
home for the Jews. 
Based on Zionist influence, the Balfour Declaration was included in the text of the 
Mandate Charter, thus providing a legally recognized mission to establish the Jewish 
homeland.  This statement enraged the Arab population and resulted in the basis for their 
political non-participation.  Furthermore, the policies London promulgated for the rule of 
Palestine privileged and advantaged the Jews.  Despite Arab protests, Jewish immigration 
continued in record numbers and Jews were granted disproportionate levels of 
representation in the local government and positions of political power.  Jewish leaders 
embraced the opportunities they were given to participate in government institutions 
because they saw them as chances to consolidate power.  The Arab leaders, however, 
boycotted working in situations where Jews were given equal recognition, consequently 
reducing their effectiveness in British government positions. 
The Arabs did not see any institutionally viable alternatives to display their 
dissatisfaction with the British policies, so they resorted to political violence.  However, 
their violent actions rarely benefited them politically.  The British refused to concede to 
Arabs demands for changes to policy following episodes of violence.  Conversely, public 
disturbances often resolved the British to support the Jewish cause with greater tenacity.  
The Arabs became labeled as the aggressors of the conflict, while Jews benefited from 
increased security force training and the implicit permission of the British to stockpile 
weapons.  In the later years of the Mandate when Jews were conducting unprovoked, 
offensive raids on Arabs, the British response was not as swift or strong as it had been 
against the Arabs.  Additionally, many Arab leaders were exiled for their perceived role 
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in instigating the violent actions committed by their people, further reducing Arab 
political effectiveness.  The relationship between the British and Jewish leaders remained 
cordial for a much longer period, until just before the outbreak of World War II.   
The significant positions Jewish leaders held in the Mandate government gave 
them the ability to unite their people to the cause of independence and develop the 
political institutions that would be necessary to achieve that goal.  The unity of effort in 
the Jewish population of Palestine was, perhaps, its greatest strength.  Alternately, the 
tribal rivalries that plagued the Arab groups were often just as damaging to their cause as 
the British policies that worked against them.  They were never able to form alliances that 
would unite in opposition to the Jewish presence.   
Abdullah, the ruler of TransJordan, was concerned with the ability to realize his 
own interests, rather than those of the greater Arab cause.  He had to balance his 
expansionist desires with the British policies he was expected to support because he was 
obligated to them for his position and continued security.  Therefore, he never attempted 
to occupy the Mandate territory until the British withdrew.  However, when the 
opportunity presented itself to obtain a greater portion of Palestinian land, Abdullah 
preferred to negotiate with the Zionists rather than his historic rival Arab brothers.  He 
entered into a scheme of collusion to divide the land of the Palestinian Mandate between 
the Zionists and himself, ignoring the desires of the Palestinian Arabs for independence.   
In summary, this thesis has determined that the Jews, the minority group in 
Palestine, were able to amass enough political power to successfully declare the 
independence of Israel.  Several factor contributed to their ability to achieve this goal.  
First, British policies tacitly favored the Jewish population.  Immigration policies, land 
purchase rights and government positions allowed the Jews to consolidate power in 
political institutions.  Second, Arab miscues in their response to the British policies, their 
political non-participation, and their decision to use political violence as a means to voice 
their dissatisfaction with those policies, disadvantaged this group.  Finally, the historic 
tribal rivalries amongst the various Arab groups inspired Abdullah to enter into a 
compromise agreement with the Zionist leaders rather than unite with the other Arabs 
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